

# European Populist Parties in Government: How Well are Voters Represented? Evidence from Greece<sup>1</sup>

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Studying populist parties in government is extremely rare compared to studying them in opposition (Rovira Kaltwasser & Taggart 2015). The reasons are generally twofold. First of all, few populist parties have formed governments, especially within the European context. Second, populism is often understood as a political strategy or rhetorical style that may be potentially rewarding while in opposition, while certainly challenging, if not harmful, when in government (to the extent that maximalist populist promises can rarely be kept). Both these statements, however, no matter how self-evident they seem, should not be taken for granted and should remain open to scrutiny. In fact, many populist governments have managed to establish long-term populist hegemonies, primarily in Latin American countries like Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela, etc. (see Panizza 2009; Hawkins 2010; Philip & Panizza 2011; De la Torre 2015), but also in Europe – the case of Greece under the populist rule of Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK throughout the 1980s and contemporary Hungary are two important cases in point (see Lyrantzis 1987; Spourdalakis 1988; Batory 2015).

In this paper we focus on the case of contemporary Greece, a European country in which, not one but two populist parties have been sharing power, having formed a coalition government after the January 2015 elections: the left-wing populist SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) and the right-wing populist nationalist ANEL (Independent Greeks) (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014; Aslanidis & Rovira Kaltwasser 2016). Interestingly enough, the coalition remained in power even though it failed to

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deliver on its promises to stop austerity and renegotiate the bail-out agreements (memoranda) between Greece and its European partners/lenders (inclusive of some sort of radical debt relief). Despite this failure, the two parties almost repeated their January performance in the September 2015 elections and continue to govern together. Not only, then, does the coalition itself represent a ‘major political novelty’ – ‘the first ever European alliance of a radical left-wing and a radical right-wing populist party’ – but also its *resilience*, ‘prevailing over every theory of economic voting’ (Aslanidis & Kaltwasser 2016: 3), seems to constitute a paradox worthy of exploring in depth.

Arguably, this conjuncture offers the opportunity to study contemporary populism in power within the European context – a context that imposes huge constraints on the materialization of populist electoral promises – and to draw important conclusions regarding the populist bond between voters and parties and its resilience that may be relevant to other cases as well and to populism research as a whole. Using data from the Greek Candidate Study 2015 and the Greek Voter Study 2015 we first explore the nature of this bond through a study of *congruence* between party voters and party elites for these two parties.<sup>2</sup> In order to introduce a comparative dimension we then contrast the elite/voter congruence of the two populist parties participating in the current coalition government (SYRIZA and ANEL) with the elite/voter congruence of mainstream parties and especially of the two parties that formed the previous (before January 2015) coalition government (PASOK and ND).

The study of congruence advanced in this paper is marked by three characteristic features:

- Such comparisons are usually conducted on the general left-right dimension. In line with novel research orientations that tend to move beyond this limited framework, in addition to the left-right axis we also compare voters and elites on a set of policy issues, e.g. economic policy, Euroscepticism (closely associated with anti-austerity preferences in Greece), immigration, law and order.
- Most important, however, the Greek datasets offer the opportunity to include the dimension of populism in this voter-elite comparison (covering thus both supply

<sup>2</sup> This combination of a Candidate Study and a Voter Study is not, of course, unique. See, for the application of a similar method with regard, however, to a European election, Costello et al. 2012: 1232. Also see Von Schoultz & Wass 2016.

and demand). Focusing on the role of the populism/anti-populism divide, a dimension beyond concrete policy preferences, may produce crucial insights regarding the resilience of populist forces in government, in Greece and beyond.

- Last but not least, our exploration of the supply side does not predominantly rely on the views of experts, but follows a ‘many-to-many’ approach engaging with the attitudes of party candidates as a more reliable source regarding a party’s profile. But, in contrast with Golder and Stramski (2010), we do not assume that all legislative representatives from the same party share the same ideological position. As Hansen and Rasmussen (2013) have demonstrated, the cohesiveness of the political parties should not be taken for granted.

In terms of the hypotheses orienting our research, both these parties are self-defined as radical (SYRIZA as radical left and ANEL as radical right), but while ANEL has earned a small part of the valid votes (circa 5%), the vote share of SYRIZA has increased from less than 5% in 2009 to more than 36% of the valid votes in 2015. We thus expect that the majority of the new SYRIZA voters are less radical than the candidates and as a result, the current median SYRIZA voter should appear to the right of the median SYRIZA candidate.

An explanation of the incongruence between leftist parties and their voters on sociocultural issues has been discussed by Thomassen (2012), who argues that, since a higher socio-economic status – and especially a higher educational level – is strongly associated with libertarian attitudes, we should expect to find voters combining a leftist attitude on socioeconomic issues with a conservative position on the libertarian/authoritarian scale. If these people vote according to their socioeconomic status, they will vote for a leftist party, but the political elites of the latter (who are usually better educated), will be more libertarian than their voters on the sociocultural dimension. According to Thomassen (2012), the growing salience of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension among the electorate has brought to light this problem of incongruence of left-authoritarian voters (Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014).

But the case of SYRIZA may be different. For SYRIZA, we expect to find incongruence not only on ‘immaterial’ issues such as immigration policy, but also on socioeconomic issues. We base this expectation on the fact that most of SYRIZA’s new

voters have moved to SYRIZA from PASOK, after PASOK was forced to implement harsh austerity measures provisioned in the bailout agreements. PASOK has far more moderate positions than SYRIZA on both the socioeconomic and the sociocultural dimensions and we do not expect to find a dramatic change of the positions of these voters who used to support PASOK and have moved to SYRIZA only recently. Such a finding would be compatible with previous findings about radical left parties. For example, Lefkofridi and Casado-Asensio (2013) have shown that while congruence in radical right parties is high, the same does not hold for radical left parties with one exception: the position towards the EU.

Consequently, we expect larger candidate/voter differences in SYRIZA than in ANEL. If this hypothesis is corroborated it might also provide some indication regarding the resilience of the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition against the background of both the significant differences between the parties and their failure to materialize their anti-austerity promises. If the distances between the median voters of these two parties are smaller than the ones between their candidates – and between their stated ideological profiles – this would de facto make the acceptance and survival of their coalition much easier. If, furthermore, a common populist profile is shared then it may help gloss over remaining differences in left/right positioning and policy preferences between the two populist parties in the current government coalition. Something that would help explain the resilience they exhibited in the September 2015 elections.

Our paper is structured as follows. First we provide some conceptual and theoretical background to the questions addressed and the main categories utilized. Then we present our methodology and data. The discussion of our findings proceeds as follows. First we examine congruence along the left-right dimension and then we move on to other policy issues, before focusing on populism. Finally, we draw a series of conclusions and formulate challenges for future research.

## **1. CONCEPTUALIZATIONS: REPRESENTATION, CONGRUENCE AND POPULISM**

Representation is generally accepted as the cornerstone of modern democracy (Pitkin

1967; Urbinati 2006). Albeit a complex phenomenon involving ‘diverse relationships between the representatives and the represented’ (Dolny & Babos 2015: 1274), a phenomenon often exceeding our normative and supposedly objective preconceptions, it is difficult to understand representation without positing some sort of connection between the preferences and interests, the identities and desires of the represented and what the representatives articulate and promote (Dolny & Babos 2015: 1274; also see Arnold & Franklin 2012). For example, representation is assumed to ‘connect, either directly or indirectly, the policy preferences of the citizenry to public policy’ (Costello et al. 2012: 1227). The nature, mechanics and functionality of this connection is usually debated in terms of policy and/or ideological *congruence*: ‘one of the most commonly used measurements of the quality of a democracy is the extent to which the positions of party elites and their supporters correspond across issue and ideological divides, something that marks the degree of representation that exists within the system’ (Karyotis et al. 2014: 435).

By most accounts, representation is a dynamic and not static process, thus making the effective measurement of congruence a tricky endeavor. As Russell Dalton has cogently put it: ‘A strong linkage between the political views of the public and political elites is one of the essential features of democratic political systems, but there remains wide debate on the functioning of the representation process in contemporary democracies’ (Dalton 2016: 1). For example, the causality of preference formation is not always clear and very often it is hard to distinguish who is first and who follows, who represents whom; a classic case of the egg and chicken dilemma (Lutz, Kissau & Rosset 2012: 3). It is along these lines that one can inquire whether a particular relation of representation should be classified in terms of delegation, trusteeship or partisanship: ‘A delegate takes instructions from voters regardless of his own opinion, a trustee makes his own decisions based on deliberation of the issues under question and a partisan follows the party’s lead when making decisions’ (Önnudottir 2014: 538).

The chances are, however, that empirical actors will fluctuate between such structural positions responding to the complex and often unpredictable choreographies of political antagonism. In that sense, representation is, by constitution, an imperfect process (Laclau 1996: 97). Even when cases of systematic distortion and deliberate disregard for

the will of the represented are excluded, what remains is ‘an opaqueness, an essential impurity in the process of representation’. Furthermore, this is a constitutive feature of representation and not some sort of temporary malfunction – as such it operates as ‘its condition of both possibility and impossibility’ (Laclau 1996: 98). For example, let us assume that a deputy is representing a group of farmers who have clearly articulated interests and demands regarding the price of agricultural products. These interests have been shaped and articulated at the local level (place A). Even in this straightforward case, the role of the representative cannot be one of a neutral transmitter. Why? Precisely because she/he has to rearticulate and inscribe the demands formulated in place A within a completely different level, that of, say, national or even European decision-making (place B). Here, however, many more things are at stake (Laclau 1996: 98). It is crucial, from a hegemonic perspective, for example, to register the fact that in place B the aforementioned interests will need to compete with other antagonistic interests. Whether a representative will eventually assume – vis-à-vis a particular issue – the role of a delegate, a trustee or a partisan is often overdetermined by the contingent and unpredictable process of this inscription within an antagonistic framework.

Similar ambiguities emerge when one focuses on the *effectiveness* of representation. Now, effective representation is usually conceptualized as presupposing two conditions:

- The political parties contesting the elections should allow voters a choice between different alternatives, different sets of policy proposals.
- Voters should cast their vote in accordance with their policy preferences.

So much so is posited by the Responsible Party Model of representation (Katz 1997; Thomassen 1994; Costello et al. 2012: 1228). And yet, these conditions are not always met. In conditions of post-democracy, for example, with the social-democratic centre-left and the liberal or conservative centre-right converging on a neoliberal agenda, little choice is offered to the electorate by credible party organizations (Crouch 2004; Mair 2013). But even if one assumes that the two aforementioned conditions do apply, they fail to guarantee congruence between voters and parties regarding particular policy positions on a one to one basis: ‘Political parties offer a package deal to the voter. By voting for a particular party, voters are forced to vote for the whole package, even though they might

favour another party on some issues. Consequently, it is possible that a party represents the view of a minority of its voters on individual issues' (Costello et al. 2012: 1228). The problem is mitigated only when agreement on a particular issue or dimension is able to guarantee, to a certain extent, a correlation on all other dimensions. In this case one could conclude that all the different positions are constrained by the same ideological frame or, to use discursive jargon, by the same discursive frontier, the same discursive architectonics. Here, the frame, the ideology or belief system that constrains the whole ensemble of policy positions and preferences and guarantees some degree of congruence, operates as a 'shortcut' that allows voters to identify and vote for a party even without knowing in detail its position on all issues (Costello et al. 2012: 1228). This is perhaps why, while most studies conclude that congruence varies greatly and largely depends on the issue at stake, it tends to be greater for ideological or highly-politicized issues (Belchior, Tsatsanis & Teixeira 2016: 280; also see Holmberg, 2000: 163–165, Pierce, 1999: 30).

By hyper-politicizing political antagonism through a simplification of what is at stake in politics, by polarizing the political debate along the lines of a central dichotomic schema – Us, the people, vs. Them, the establishment – populist discourse attempts to offer such 'shortcuts' – what Laclau would call 'nodal points' – inscribing salient 'frontiers' within social and political space and thus creating an 'equivalence' between issues, policy proposals and demands that would otherwise remain unconnected. Especially in conditions of structural crisis, when such demands become frustrated and the forces in power fail to address these issues, a new representation can emerge splitting the social field by paratactically grouping differences, temporarily reducing their multiplicity into a single polarity: 'Vis-a-vis oppressive forces, for instance, a set of particularities establish relations of equivalence between themselves' (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: xiii). It becomes clear that apart from claiming to represent the popular will, apart that is to say from ascribing a privileged position to 'the people', which now comes to function as a nodal point, as *shortcut*, populism presupposes a privileging of this logic of equivalence: populist discourse typically involves the establishment of linkages between a series of initially heterogeneous unsatisfied demands and preferences, which – reducing the relative value attributed to their individual specificity – enter into relations of

equivalence thus forming a collective identity around ‘the people’ and the leadership representing them. The equivalential linkage sublimating heterogeneity is achieved through the opposition towards a common enemy (the power bloc, the establishment) accused of frustrating the satisfaction of these demands in the first place.

## **2. MEASURING CONGRUENCE**

In the past congruence was typically studied by comparing the attitudes of voters with what opinion polls or panels of experts considered to be the attitudes of politicians or the positions of parties. Following Golder & Stramski’s work (2010), who proposed a reconceptualization of voter-representative congruence as a many-to-many relationship, many recent studies prefer to use surveys of elected members of parliament (see, for example, Dolny & Babos 2015; Belchior, Tsatsanis & Teixeira 2016) or candidates (see, for example, Costello et al. 2012; Leimgruber, Hangartner & Leemann 2010; Von Schoultz & Wass 2016) instead of evaluations by experts or opinion polls on political parties or politicians (Dolny & Babos 2015: 1275). Arguably, such a methodological orientation offers a more direct representation of political elite preferences and desires. Nevertheless, replacing expert and public opinion on political elite attitudes is still considered a novelty (Dolny & Babos 2015: 1274); it seems, however, to be a novelty worth reproducing and consolidating in researching such a complex and ambivalent terrain. Indeed this is the orientation we have followed.

Yet, following a suggestion made by an anonymous reviewer, we have also tried to cross-validate the estimates extracted by the candidates with the party position estimates provided by the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al 2015). The difference between the two estimates is very small for almost all parties and almost all issues. One significant exception that merits some discussion is the estimated position of ANEL on the general left-right scale. The 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) positions ANEL at the extreme right (8.8) while the position extracted for the same party by our candidate study is at the center of the scale (5). Looking more carefully at both datasets we can entertain a possible explanation of the large distance between the two estimates: both studies classify ANEL near the center of the economic left/right scale; both studies classify ANEL to the right of the scale of the sociocultural issues; but when



CHES experts are asked to position ANEL on the general left/right scale, it seems that they give more weight to the sociocultural dimension. By contrast, ANEL candidates seem to self-position themselves on the general left/right scale by placing more weight on their economic policy preferences (and it seems that the same holds for their voters). With hindsight, the resilience of the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition seems to corroborate this hypothesis; here, taking for granted the CHES results would present this coalition as something much more unlikely and unstable than it seems to be.

Now, our aim of examining the Greek populist parties currently in power is bound to entail discriminating between different types of populism as well as between populist and non-populist or anti-populist parties. It thus becomes clear that, to the extent that Golder and Stramski place emphasis on the connection between all citizens and either the parliament or the government *in toto*, an alternative approach is needed. One close to the partisan-constituency model, which brings to the fore the relationship between a party and its voters (Ezrow 2010; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012; Önnudottir 2014: 541). Obviously, the structure and genealogy of parliamentary systems itself elevates political parties into a special position in the representation process (Dalton 2016: 2). Indeed, the most institutionalized key actors here, besides the voters, are political parties: ‘They directly or indirectly translate their electoral mandate into public policy’ (Costello et al. 2012: 1227). They thus merit out attention, especially when exhibiting such unique characteristics like the ones seen in our case (radical left-right coalition under the populist banner; paradoxical resilience).

As far as measurement is concerned, it is very often assumed that political antagonism and the competition between parties and party families is more or less organized along a left/right frontier and is very much determined by it (Sani and Sartori 1983). Indeed, much of the relevant congruence literature accepts the predominance of a *unidimensional* issue space, which usually takes the form of a ‘left–right scale’ (Dolny & Babos 2015: 1275). There is no doubt that this cleavage can explain a lot and has thus been included in our inquiry. And yet, it has been increasingly demonstrated that attitudes, preferences and policy positions on a variety of issues – including law and order, immigration, European integration, etc. – are not necessarily constrained by the left/right frontier (Hooghe et al. 2002; Kriesi et al. 2006; Costello et al. 2012; Dolny &

Babos 2015: 1278). In other words, the utilization of a left/right scale captures the congruence between voters and elites only in a limited way (Lutz, Kissau & Rosset 2012: 1). It is thus important to explore congruence beyond this dimension (Karyotis et al. 2014), something implemented in this paper.<sup>3</sup> Even if not many studies have utilized other dimensions, issues and potential cleavages like the following have been explored in the available literature: redistribution, employment, defense, law and order, participation, foreign policy, attitudes towards borders and currency, post-materialism, environmental protection, traditional vs. authoritarian values, European integration, immigration, etc. (Holmberg 1989; Inglehart 1990; Pierce 1999; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999; Hooghe et al. 2004; Mattila and Raunio 2006; Valen and Narud 2007; Kriesi et al. 2012; Lutz, Kissau & Rosset 2012; Giger and Lefkofridi 2014; Dalton 2016; Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016).

Another problem with left-right self-placement is that voters (especially voters who are less educated and less involved in politics) may use party identification (as the method that requires the smallest cognitive as well as affective effort by them) to position themselves on the left-right scale. As put by Inglehart & Klingemann (1976): ‘If a respondent feels close to a given party and knows that people say it is located on the extreme left, he may place himself accordingly’ (p. 244). Consequently, a high value of congruence based on voters’ left-right self-placement does not necessarily indicate high ideological congruence: it could be a mere result of party identification and assumed knowledge of the position of the party.

Most crucially, it has been argued that moving beyond the unidimensional left/right axis becomes especially important when ‘the structure of political competition is becoming more complex, new issues are entering the political agenda, and new parties are engaging the voters’ (Dalton 2016: 1). This has been precisely the case in crisis-ridden Greece, where a collapsing economy, the liquidation of a party system unable to manage the crisis in a reliable way and the imposition of draconian austerity measures under the continuous monitoring of the so-called *troika* – the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF and their representatives on the ground – have transformed the terms of

<sup>3</sup> In addition, if one of the main reasons why ‘the left-right “super issue” is so widely used is the comparability over time and across nations’ (Lutz, Kissau & Rosset 2012: 4) the fact that our study is restricted to one country makes this passage from unidimensional to a multidimensional perspective much easier.

political competition. Hence new issues were introduced in the public space: (a) the stance towards the so-called memoranda, i.e. the bail-out agreements between Greece and its lenders, which created a pro-memorandum/anti-memorandum divide; (b) the growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy and representation which triggered the development of demands for real democracy and catalyzed party de-alignment. To express anti-memorandum sentiment and represent frustrated popular demands and the associated protest movements new parties have entered the limelight, only to be denounced as ‘populist’ by the old party system in crisis, thus establishing a populism/anti-populism frontier (Stavrakakis 2014; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014). For all these additional reasons, Greece does seem to constitute a suitable case study (Rudig & Karyotis 2014; Karyotis et al. 2014: 436).

### **3. METHODS AND DATA**

After measuring congruence on the general left/right scale, we explore voter/candidate issue congruence by utilizing questions on a set of different policies, which were posed in the Greek 2015 voter and candidate surveys in an identical way. But instead of using the single item measures that suffer from a variety of limitations (see Evans, Heath, & Lalljee 1996) we have been able to employ multiple-item scales because we use 15 questions that belong to four dimensions: (a) economic policy preferences (b) attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy preferences, (c) preferences on law and order policies, and (d) opinions regarding the agreements with the Troika (memoranda) and attitudes towards the membership of Greece in the EU. Finally, we compare voters and candidates on a dimension (index) that, to our knowledge, has not been used before for a similar comparison: populist attitudes.

We should clarify that when we use these 15 questions, we do not claim that we are describing the structure of the Greek political space. For the purposes of the current paper, we only need to show that each subgroup of items forms a reliable unidimensional scale. The reliability of each scale can be tested with Cronbach’s alpha and ordinal alpha (Gadermann, Guhn and Zumbo, 2012). For the unidimensionality we run factor analysis both with and without using sampling weights because as Kaplan and Ferguson (1999) have shown, ignoring sampling weights can lead to serious bias in the estimation of the

parameters of a latent variable model. In addition, since we focus on unidimensional scales with Likert type items, we follow van der Eijk and Rose (2015) and we apply factor analysis using polychoric correlations and Mokken scale analysis (van Schuur, 2003) using the R package *mokken* (Van der Ark, 2012). All measures (presented in the Appendix) show that the four scales are unidimensional, and adequately reliable.

One of the ways of using these four scales is to save the factor scores. There are two problems with the factor scores: (a) they are sensitive to the methods used to extract and rotate the factors, and (b) their interpretation may be difficult because their range and scale are generally different from the range and scale of the original items (Di Stefano, Zhu, and Mindrila 2009). Since we purport to construct an index on the same scale as the original items and the factor loadings of the items are not very different, we have followed the simpler approach of calculating the average value of the items of each factor.

To measure congruence, we follow many of the ideas and congruence formulas presented by Golder and Stramski (2010). Thus, we use three measures of congruence almost identical to those used by them: the Absolute Median Voter Distance, the Average Absolute Voter Distance and the Relative Voter Distance. Finally, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test (Darling 1957) to check the hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the same distribution. In order to cover the cases that the underlying distribution cannot be considered as continuous, we have used the function *ks.boot()* available in R (Sekhon 2011) as a suitable modification of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for non-continuous variables and we have not found significant differences. In addition to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, we visualize the empirical cumulative distributions of the data. By doing that, we give a clear visual sense of the distribution of the data without any data transformations. With the presentation of the empirical cumulative distributions for both voters and candidates of a party on the same plots, it becomes much easier to observe the ‘many to many’ congruence.

The data used in this paper come from two sources: the Hellenic (Greek) Candidate Study and the Hellenic (Greek) Voter Study for the Greek Parliamentary elections of January 2015. The candidate study is part of the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) and the voter study is part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

(CSES) and the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP). The data of these studies are available from the website of the Hellenic National Election Studies (<http://www.elines.gr>) and have been used in many national and international publications (e.g. Andreadis 2012; Freire *et al.* 2014; Teperoglou, Chadjipadelis and Andreadis 2010; Teperoglou *et al.* 2014).

The 2015 Greek Candidate Study was conducted from mid-February to end of July 2015 as a web survey (Andreadis 2010) and the population of interest is the group of all candidates running with the five following parties: SYRIZA, ND, RIVER, PASOK, ANEL. The other two parties with elected MPs after the January 2015 election – the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and Golden Dawn (GD) – have always and consistently refused to participate in the Greek Candidate survey. Given the lack of responses from KKE and GD candidates we had two options: (a) leave the corresponding cells in our tables empty, or (b) fill-in the information from other sources. We have decided to follow the second approach. The way to do this was conditioned by the fact that almost all items used in this paper were included in the Greek Voting Advice Application HelpMeVote (Andreadis 2013; Andreadis 2015) and that the position of the parties in the statements used in HelpMeVote 2015 were formulated by a group of 14 Greek political parties experts. Thus, in order to avoid leaving empty the cells on the position of KKE and GD candidates, we use the responses of the 14 experts as if we had responses from 14 candidates from each of these two parties. Thus, readers should take this into account when encountering the KKE and GD ‘candidate’ estimates presented later in this paper.<sup>4</sup>

The 2015 Greek Candidate Study dataset includes 520 completed questionnaires and, according to Andreadis (2016a), (a) the response rate is between 35.2% and 37.6% (depending on how the cases of unknown eligibility are used in the formula)<sup>5</sup>; (b) distribution per party in the sample is similar to the distribution per party in the population; (c) the distribution of electoral districts in the sample is very similar to the

4 The estimated positions of KKE and Golden Dawn are included in this paper in order to present to the reader a complete picture of the political map of the Greek parliamentary parties. However, the focus of the paper is on the two populist government parties; as a result, we do not discuss the position of KKE and Golden Dawn.

5 The minimum response rate accepted by the Comparative Candidates Survey is 20%

corresponding distribution in the population; (d) the elected MPs are slightly under-represented in the sample, but the gap is not very large (8.1% of the sample and 12.5% of the population); and (e) there is a high level of correspondence between sample and population as far as gender distribution is concerned.

The Hellenic (Greek) Voter Study for the Greek parliamentary elections of January 2015 (ELNES 2015a) is a mixed-mode survey conducted by the Laboratory of Applied Political Research at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. The recruitment process lasted from June 12 until July 16 using RDD (Random Digit Dialing). The respondents were asked to provide their email address in order to participate in a web survey conducted by the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. The 1008 completed cases were collected either as web-based self-administered questionnaires or using telephone interviews (CATI). The web was the main data collection mode of the survey and the telephone interview was used as an auxiliary method for the respondents who lacked internet access and/or an email account (Andreadis, Kartsounidou & Chatzimallis 2015). The sample was designed to be representative of the Greek electorate, but some groups (especially older and less educated people) are under-represented. In order to get estimates that are as close as possible to the quantities of interest in the population we have applied the weights disseminated along with the dataset. (Andreadis 2016b). Table 1 shows the distribution of valid votes in the sample and compares it with the distribution of the valid votes from the official election results.

<<TABLE 1 NEAR HERE>>

#### **4. THE LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION**

In order to measure the voter/candidate congruence on the left/right dimension, we use the responses to a left/right self-placement question that was asked both to Greek candidates and voters. The wording of the question is as follows:

**In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?**

<<TABLE 2 NEAR HERE>>

Table 2 shows that the median SYRIZA candidate is more to the left than the median SYRIZA voter. A similar difference is observed in PASOK, where the median candidate is more to the left than the median voter. On the other hand, for ND, RIVER and ANEL the median candidate of the party is exactly on the same position with the median voter of the party; as a result, for these three parties both the absolute median voter distance and the relative voter distance get the minimum value of zero distance, indicating the maximum possible voter-candidate congruence.

The many to many measure of congruence (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) verifies the aforementioned findings. The KS p-values for SYRIZA are lower than 0.001; this means that there is a statistically significant distance between voters and candidates. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic takes the value of 0.4174 indicating that at least on a point of the left/right axis, the difference of the cumulative percentages between SYRIZA voters and SYRIZA candidates is larger than 40%.

<< DIAGRAM 1 NEAR HERE >>

Diagram 1 shows the empirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDFs) of both voters and candidates on the Left/Right (L/R) axis for the two parties which participate in the current Greek coalition government (SYRIZA and ANEL) and for the two parties which used to participate in the government coalition before January 2015 (PASOK and ND). We can easily register the large distance between SYRIZA voters and SYRIZA candidates on the L/R axis by observing the visualizations of the corresponding ECDFs: we can see that the SYRIZA voter/candidate distance is small at the first point of the distribution because both lines appear to start a little lower from 0.2, indicating that in both groups less than 20% position themselves on 0 (the extreme left position). But as we move to the right the voter/candidate distance increases rapidly: on the next point (value 1 of the L/R axis) the candidates' ECDF line climbs over 0.4 indicating that more than 40% of the candidates position themselves on 0 or 1 of the L/R axis. On the other hand, the voters' ECDF line remains near 0.2 indicating that only 20% of the SYRIZA voters position themselves on 0 or 1. The distance becomes dramatic and takes its maximum value on the next point (value 2 of the L/R axis). On this point the candidates' ECDF line

approaches 0.8 indicating that about 80% of SYRIZA candidates position themselves on 0, 1 or 2 on the L/R axis. On the same point, SYRIZA voters' ECDF line remains well below 0.4 indicating that less than 40% of the SYRIZA voters position themselves on 0, 1 and 2. This large difference explains the small p-values of the corresponding Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. A very interesting observation about the voters of SYRIZA comes from the comparison of their ECDF with that of PASOK candidates. The line of SYRIZA voters seems to be much closer to the line of PASOK candidates than to the line of SYRIZA candidates.

Moving to the other parties presented on the diagram: For PASOK we can see that the candidates' ECDF is higher than the voters' ECDF on two points of the L/R axis (points 3 and 4) indicating that the percentage of respondents who place themselves on 4 or left of 4 is higher in the group of PASOK candidates than in the group of PASOK voters. However, the voter/candidate distance is smaller in PASOK than the one observed in SYRIZA and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values are not lower than 0.001. The ECDFs of ND and ANEL show very high voter/candidate congruence. For both of these parties we can observe that both the voters' and candidates' ECDF lines remain at very low levels (less than 0.2) until point 4 of the L/R axis, indicating the small percentage of respondents who place themselves left of the middle point of the L/R axis. The main difference between ND and ANEL is on point 5. For both ANEL voters and candidates, we observe a steep slope on point 5 of the L/R axis. This means the L/R distribution in ANEL is very dense. In fact, we can see that circa 50% of both ANEL voters and candidates position themselves on point 5 of the L/R scale. On the other hand, the lines for ND are shallower, indicating a sparser distribution.

## **5. ISSUE CONGRUENCE**

In this section we study the voter/candidate congruence on four issue dimensions. We are going to use the four indexes we have created according to the description presented in the Appendix (each index is the average value of the items of each factor): (a) an economic policy index (higher values indicate a preference towards right leaning economic policies); (b) an immigration policy index (higher values indicate more negative attitudes towards immigrants); (c) a law and order index (higher values indicate



a preference for stricter law enforcement); and (d) an EU and memoranda index (lower values indicate anti-Troika, anti-EU and anti-Memoranda positions).

Table 3 shows the measure of voter/candidate congruence based on the economic policy index. Similar to the findings based on L/R self-placement, the median SYRIZA candidate is more to the left than the median SYRIZA voter. The KS p-values for SYRIZA are lower than 0.001; this means that there is a statistical significant distance of economic policy preferences between SYRIZA voters and SYRIZA candidates; this is also obvious by the visualization of the corresponding ECDFs presented in Diagram 2. In PASOK, the median candidate is more to the left than the median voter, but the distance between candidates and voters is much smaller from the corresponding distance observed for PASOK on the L/R axis. For ND and RIVER the median candidate of the party is slightly closer to the right than the median voter of the party. Surprisingly, we observe that the median ANEL candidate of the party is slightly closer to the left than the median ANEL voter of the party, but if we use mean values instead of median values we observe the opposite. The explanation can be given by looking at the ECDFs of ANEL voters and candidates in Diagram 2: Near the extreme right of the scale we can see only the line of candidates. This indicates that there are some ANEL candidates but no ANEL voters with extreme right economic preferences and explains the larger mean value in ANEL candidates than in ANEL voters.

<<TABLE 3 & DIAGRAM 2 NEAR HERE>>

Table 4 shows the measure of voter/candidate congruence based on the immigration policy index. Again, the median SYRIZA candidate is more to the left of the scale (more pro-immigrant) than the median SYRIZA voter. According to the KS test the distance of immigration policy preferences between SYRIZA voters and SYRIZA candidates is statistically significant; this is also obvious by the visualization of the corresponding ECDFs presented in Diagram 3. The same problem appears in RIVER with its candidates being significantly more to the left of its voters. Similarly, in ANEL, the median candidate is slightly closer to the left than the median voter, but in any case the number of respondents positioned left of the middle point of the scale is very small.

The maximum congruence is observed in ND with zero distance between the median voter and the median candidate.

<<TABLE 4 & DIAGRAM 3 NEAR HERE>>

Table 5 shows the measure of voter/candidate congruence based on the law and order policy index. This dimension seems to be the easier to achieve voter/candidate congruence: for ND, RIVER, ANEL and PASOK we observe zero distance between the median voter and the median candidate. In addition, for almost all parties the distance between voters and candidates is not significant at the 0.001 level. But again, the median SYRIZA candidate is more to the left of the scale (preference for less strict enforcement of the law) than the median SYRIZA voter and again this distance is significant according to the KS test. Similar to all the previous diagrams presented up to this point of this paper, from Diagram 4 it seems that the voters of SYRIZA are closer to PASOK candidates than SYRIZA candidates as far as law and order policy preferences are concerned.

<<TABLE 5 & DIAGRAM 4 NEAR HERE>>

Table 6 shows the measure of voter/candidate congruence based on the EU and memoranda index. Here is a policy dimension where the median SYRIZA candidate is exactly at the same position with the median SYRIZA voter. In addition, this is the first dimension in which the voters of SYRIZA do not seem to be closer to the candidates of PASOK; instead their ECDF seems very close to the ECDF of the SYRIZA candidates (Diagram 5).

<<TABLE 6 & DIAGRAM 5 NEAR HERE>>

## **6. EMPLOYING A POPULIST INDEX: SUPPLY AND DEMAND**

We have already seen that congruence encompasses a salient connection between citizens and political elites either on particular policy preferences or on broader ideological issues (Önnudóttir 2014, Donly & Babos 2015: 1276). When moving from the former level to the latter one encounters ideological positions that ‘are not constrained by the main dimension of contestation in European politics, the left/right dimension’ (Costello et al.

2012: 1227, 1231). According to Costello et al., together with euroscepticism, populism belongs to this category.

Now, in the literature on populism it has already been shown that both the elites (supply side) and the voters (demand side) of parties that are identified as ‘populist’ have specific populist attitudes that may be quantitatively measured: this is done by using their responses to a battery of populist attitudes items in order to create a populism index for each respondent. The first version of populist attitudes items have been developed by Kirk Hawkins and Scott Riding (2010). The same datasets and a similar analysis were used later in a paper by Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012). Building on the aforementioned studies, Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2013) have tested a battery of items to measure populist attitudes and to investigate whether these attitudes can be linked with party preferences in the Dutch case. The way we have chosen to formulate our questions attempts to facilitate further an evolving dialogue between this ‘new mainstream’ in populism studies and a discursive approach based on ‘minimal criteria’ and inspired by the Essex School (Towshend 2003, Laclau 2005a; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014; Stavrakakis, Andreadis & Katsambekis 2016).

We have used the average value of seven items (presented in the Appendix) to create an index of populist attitudes for each voter and for each candidate who participated in the Greek surveys. In previous research (using candidate data only) it has been demonstrated that this index can be very useful in discriminating between populist and mainstream parties: this can be done by summarizing the candidates’ populism indexes by political party in order to create a populism index for each political party (Stavrakakis, Andreadis & Katsambekis 2016). It seems that the value 3.5 is a threshold separating populist from non-populist parties in Greece because the populist index mean value of the candidates running with mainstream parties is below this threshold and the populist index mean value of the candidates running with populist parties is above this threshold. Statistical tests comparing these indexes indicate a significant difference between populist and non-populist parties.

In this paper, we use the same index in order to measure the populism voter/candidate congruence. For all parties the distance between voters and candidates is small and the KS test does not indicate a significant difference at the 0.001 level (Table

7). Diagram 6 shows that the candidates of SYRIZA, PASOK and ND are slightly less populist than their voters, while the candidates of ANEL are slightly more populist than their voters. However, the distances are very small and they cannot be deemed as significant.

<<TABLE 7 & DIAGRAM 6 NEAR HERE>>

From the last two comparisons (EU/austerity and populist attitudes) we can observe that we have high congruence both between SYRIZA voters and candidates and between SYRIZA and ANEL as well as a marked differentiation from the other mainstream parties. It is obviously here that one can locate the core of shared representations between the two coalition partners and their voters.

## CONCLUSION

We have tried in this paper to research the novelty presented by the governing coalition established in crisis-ridden Greece between two populist parties: one radical left and one radical right, SYRIZA and ANEL. This case merits our attention not only because of this rare cohabitation, but also because of the resilience it has exhibited and enjoyed. Our main hypotheses were that a study of ‘many to many’ congruence between party candidates and voters would reveal that, due to its unprecedented rally from a fringe party to a dominant political player, the majority of the new SYRIZA voters would be less radical than the candidates and, as a result, the distance between the median voters of these two parties smaller than the ones between their candidates – and between their stated ideological profiles. This would help explain the acceptance by their electoral constituencies of their initial coalition in January 2015; it could also provide some indications regarding its survival in a period marked by an extremely bumpy negotiation with European and international institutions, the eventual capitulation after the referendum of 5 July 2015 and the resulting party splits. As Takis Pappas has put it,

beyond anybody’s (especially the pollsters’) expectations, Syriza won big [in September 2015]. This, mind you, happened in the face of a disastrous term in office during which unemployment didn’t decline, the banks closed and capital controls were imposed, Greece’s future in the euro was seriously risked, and Syriza suffered a huge internal party split. And yet, in the course

of this most calamitous year for the country, Syriza's share of the vote only declined from 36.3 percent in January to 35.5 percent in September (Pappas 2015).

How can one account for this paradox? Can one produce evidence indicating the existence of policy preferences and/or discursive divides or frontiers that have been shared not only between the two parties but between voters and candidates in both of them – in opposition to other non-populist or anti-populist parties – and thus being able to operate as 'shortcuts', as common frames constraining other issue dimensions and explaining the resilience of the coalition exhibited in the September 2015 elections?

Our analysis of the relevant data has highlighted the low voter-elite congruence marking SYRIZA on a variety of levels: (a) left/right self-placement (candidates are more to the left than voters); (b) economic policy (candidates are located more to the left compared to voters); (c) immigration (candidates are more pro-immigrant); and (d) law and order (voters are more conservative). Paradoxically, this 'drawback' may have made the coalition with ANEL more palatable to the SYRIZA constituency. Indeed, our findings could explain why SYRIZA voters were not disappointed (at least not to the expected degree) by the decision made by the leader of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras, to prefer the right-wing party ANEL as his political ally. On the basis of the distances between the candidates of these two parties, such a coalition would seem very difficult. But, the distances between their voters are smaller, making the coalition a more obvious choice. In fact, on economic and immigration policies, the median SYRIZA voter is closer to the median ANEL candidate than to the median SYRIZA candidate. Thus, instead of being a disadvantage, the coalition with ANEL may have been a win-win situation for SYRIZA: (a) if SYRIZA had applied its most radical policies (especially on economy and immigration) the majority of SYRIZA voters (who are more moderate) would be alienated, to some degree, from the party; (b) in front of the demands made by its most radical leftist supporters (representing a small part of SYRIZA voters) the coalition with ANEL could be used as a necessary constraint that prevents SYRIZA from applying its policies without consulting the coalition partner. This has not restrained SYRIZA from introducing bills on issues related to same-sex civil unions, naturalization

of immigrant children and the building of a Mosque in Athens, in which ANEL voted against; it may have, however, limited the scope of such reforms.

On the other hand, SYRIZA voters and SYRIZA candidates do not differ significantly as far as the last two dimensions we examined are concerned: (a) anti-austerity, anti-Troika preferences and (b) populist attitudes. The polarization on crisis-related issues in Greece throughout the last few years has been so deep that sharing a populist and anti-memoranda, anti-Troika profile – against the anti-populist, pro-memoranda stance of mainstream parties – seems to have been more than enough to cultivate strong identifications and to provide Tsipras with ample space for manoeuvring in the formation of governments. It may indeed be the case that a populism/anti-populism cleavage currently overdetermines Greek politics much more than a left/right one or particular policy preferences (Pappas 2014; Stavrakakis 2014).

At any rate, this evidence can help us account for the trajectory of political antagonism in the Greek context throughout 2015 and in drawing some broader conclusions. It may also permit the development of a hypothesis (in need of further research) concerning the resilience of such identifications:

How are we to explain the foregoing developments in Greece? Clearly, neither the theory of economic voting nor of ideological preference is of any help. In the first case, Tsipras should have been severely penalized for the worsening shape of the economy, while, in the second case, left ideological voters should have turned against him for giving kudos during the campaign to right-wing ANEL and pledging to form a coalition with that party in order to enter parliament. So, what happened? (Pappas 2015).

At least on a first level, the resilience of the resulting political identification does not exclusively rely on the materialization of promises and it is because of this that it does not suffer defeat when such populist promises cannot be kept (Mudde 2015) Especially under the constraints imposed on Greece by its membership of the euro-zone, the establishment and reproduction of the populist/anti-populist frontier as a salient divide or even an effective cleavage that functions as a ‘shortcut’ constraining issue preferences (as well as – to a lesser extent – the similar operation of the pro-memoranda/anti-memoranda divide) gains much independence from the actual materialization of concrete promises

following from them. In this context, what becomes more important than keeping the promises is being seen as trying hard to implement them (no matter whether the attempt itself has been successful) and being vehemently denounced even for that attempt by the opposition as being ‘populist’. Relying on the representation of salient dichotomies and on the identity/difference dialectic, populist political discourse may be in a better position to deal with policy failure when this can be attributed to the power of a formidable adversary at the trans-national level and when it can still attract the anti-populist wrath of internal party antagonists, sustaining thus in the eyes of the voters a continuity between populism in opposition and populism in power. Future comparative research will have to examine whether these findings on elite/voter congruence provide insights relevant to other populist parties in government in other European countries and beyond and/or whether the observed dynamic blend between low congruence on certain divides and issues and high on others, especially on populist attitudes, reveals a broader pattern related to the resilience of populist politics.

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## TABLES

**Table 1. Distribution of valid votes in the sample**

Party	N	Percent (of valid votes)	Actual percent of vote in election
SYRIZA	274	36.6	36.3
ND	193	25.8	27.8
GD	30	4.0	6.3
RIVER	67	8.9	6.1
KKE	47	6.3	5.5
ANEL	40	5.3	4.8
PASOK	43	5.7	4.7
Other	55	7.3	8.5

**Table 2. Left-Right voter-candidate congruence**

	MV	MC	AMVD	AAVD	RVD	KS D	KS p
SYRIZA	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.97	0.16	0.4174	0.000
ND	7.00	7.00	0.00	1.40	0.00	0.1286	0.346
GD	6.00	9.00	3.00	3.25	0.43	0.6264	0.006
POTAMI	5.00	5.00	0.00	1.03	0.00	0.1241	0.406
KKE	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.50	0.00	0.1905	0.888
ANEL	5.00	5.00	0.00	0.61	0.00	0.1564	0.634
PASOK	5.00	4.00	1.00	1.04	0.21	0.3263	0.005

MV: median voter position, MC: median candidate position, AMVD: absolute median voter distance, AAVD: average absolute voter distance, RVD: relative voter distance, KS D: Kolmogorov Smirnov D statistic, KS p: p-value for Kolmogorov Smirnov test, Source: ELNES voter survey 2015a, ELNES candidate survey 2015; MC and KS estimates for GD and KKE are based on HelpMeVote experts

**Table 3. Economic policy voter-candidate congruence**

	MV	MC	AMVD	AAVD	RVD	KS D	KS p
SYRIZA	3.00	1.67	1.33	1.53	0.37	0.5218	0.000
ND	3.67	4.00	0.33	0.52	0.04	0.1184	0.314
GD	3.33	3.33	0.00	0.63	0.00	0.2527	0.682
POTAMI	3.67	4.00	0.33	0.59	0.05	0.2349	0.004
KKE	2.33	1.50	0.83	1.09	0.17	0.5000	0.022
ANEL	3.00	2.67	0.33	0.93	0.04	0.1313	0.766
PASOK	3.67	3.33	0.34	0.80	0.03	0.1559	0.447

MV: median voter position, MC: median candidate position, AMVD: absolute median voter distance, AAVD: average absolute voter distance, RVD: relative voter distance, KS D: Kolmogorov Smirnov D statistic, KS p: p-value for Kolmogorov Smirnov test

Sources: ELNES voter survey 2015a, ELNES candidate survey 2015; MC and KS estimates for GD and KKE are based on HelpMeVote experts



**Table 4. Immigration policy voter-candidate congruence**

	MV	MC	AMVD	AAVD	RVD	KS D	KS p
SYRIZA	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.36	0.27	0.5661	0.000
ND	3.33	3.33	0.00	0.53	0.00	0.0641	0.940
GD	4.33	5.00	0.67	0.60	0.36	0.6978	0.002
POTAMI	3.00	2.33	0.67	0.98	0.27	0.3931	0.000
KKE	2.67	2.00	0.67	1.21	0.28	0.5000	0.022
ANEL	4.00	3.67	0.33	0.61	0.05	0.1542	0.540
PASOK	3.00	2.67	0.33	0.97	0.10	0.2055	0.152

MV: median voter position, MC: median candidate position, AMVD: absolute median voter distance, AAVD: average absolute voter distance, RVD: relative voter distance, KS D: Kolmogorov Smirnov D statistic, KS p: p-value for Kolmogorov Smirnov test

Sources: ELNES voter survey 2015a, ELNES candidate survey 2015; MC and KS estimates for GD and KKE are based on HelpMeVote experts

**Table 5. Law and order voter-candidate congruence**

	MV	MC	AMVD	AAVD	RVD	KS D	KS p
SYRIZA	2.67	2.33	0.34	0.95	0.13	0.3865	0.000
ND	3.67	3.67	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.0786	0.799
GD	3.67	5.00	1.33	1.14	0.55	0.5659	0.013
POTAMI	3.33	3.33	0.00	0.56	0.00	0.0969	0.642
KKE	2.67	1.50	1.17	1.27	0.37	0.4762	0.034
ANEL	3.00	3.00	0.00	0.83	0.00	0.1377	0.667
PASOK	3.33	3.33	0.00	0.69	0.00	0.1367	0.600

MV: median voter position, MC: median candidate position, AMVD: absolute median voter distance, AAVD: average absolute voter distance, RVD: relative voter distance, KS D: Kolmogorov Smirnov D statistic, KS p: p-value for Kolmogorov Smirnov test

Sources: ELNES voter survey 2015a, ELNES candidate survey 2015; MC and KS estimates for GD and KKE are based on HelpMeVote experts

**Table 6. EU and memoranda voter-candidate congruence**

	MV	MC	AMVD	AAVD	RVD	KS D	KS p
SYRIZA	2.50	2.50	0.00	0.51	0.00	0.1554	0.034
ND	4.00	4.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.0487	0.996
GD	2.50	1.41	1.09	1.02	0.56	0.7088	0.001
POTAMI	3.83	4.17	0.34	0.69	0.06	0.2403	0.003
KKE	2.33	1.00	1.33	1.33	0.62	0.8571	0.000
ANEL	2.50	2.17	0.33	0.48	0.03	0.2121	0.201
PASOK	4.17	4.33	0.16	0.68	0.02	0.0893	0.957

MV: median voter position, MC: median candidate position, AMVD: absolute median voter distance, AAVD: average absolute voter distance, RVD: relative voter distance, KS D: Kolmogorov Smirnov D statistic, KS p: p-value for Kolmogorov Smirnov test

Sources: ELNES voter survey 2015a, ELNES candidate survey 2015; MC and KS estimates for GD and KKE are based on HelpMeVote experts

**Table 7. Populist attitudes voter-candidate congruence**

	MV	MC	AMVD	AAVD	RVD	KS D	KS p
SYRIZA	3.86	3.71	0.15	0.53	0.04	0.1548	0.033
ND	3.00	2.86	0.14	0.58	0.04	0.1185	0.322
GD	3.57	3.93	0.36	0.39	0.16	0.3297	0.456
POTAMI	3.00	3.00	0.00	0.43	0.00	0.0591	0.983
KKE	3.86	4.14	0.28	0.47	0.07	0.3810	0.148
ANEL	3.86	4.00	0.14	0.57	0.03	0.0808	0.996
PASOK	3.14	2.86	0.28	0.73	0.09	0.1996	0.177

MV: median voter position, MC: median candidate position, AMVD: absolute median voter distance, AAVD: average absolute voter distance, RVD: relative voter distance, KS D: Kolmogorov Smirnov D statistic, KS p: p-value for Kolmogorov Smirnov test

Sources: ELNES voter survey 2015a, ELNES candidate survey 2015; MC and KS estimates for GD and KKE are based on HelpMeVote experts

Diagram 1. Left/Right ECDFs for SYRIZA, ANEL, PASOK and ND




Diagram 2. Economic policy index ECDFs for SYRIZA, ANEL, PASOK and ND




Diagram 3. Immigration policy index ECDFs for SYRIZA, ANEL, PASOK and ND




Diagram 4. Law and order index ECDFs for SYRIZA, ANEL, PASOK and ND






Diagram 5. EU and memoranda index ECDFs for SYRIZA, ANEL, PASOK and ND





Diagram 6. Populist attitudes ECDFs for SYRIZA, ANEL, PASOK and ND



## APPENDIX

### Measures of congruence

In order to get a single position for a party to be used in the ‘many to one’ formulas, we can use the median value of the position of its candidates ( $MC_i$ ). Then we can define the Absolute Median Voter Distance for party  $i$  ( $AMVD_i$ ) as the absolute distance between the median voter of party  $i$  ( $MV_i$ ) and the median candidate of the same party ( $MC_i$ ), i.e.

$$AMVD_i = |MV_i - MC_i|.$$

Instead of using single estimated point for the preferences of the party voters, we can use their distribution and we can define the Average Absolute Voter Distance for party  $i$  ( $AAVD_i$ ) as the average absolute distance between the voters of party  $i$  and the median candidate of the same party ( $MC_i$ ):

$$AAVD_i = \frac{1}{n_i} \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} |V_{ji} - MC_i|$$

where  $n_i$  are the total number of voters of the party  $i$  and  $V_{ji}$  is the position of voter  $j$  of the party  $i$ .

The minimum level of  $AAVD_i$  is not independent of the dispersion of voter preferences; it is much easier for candidates of homogenous parties to produce congruence compared to candidates of more heterogeneous parties. In order to deal with this problems, we use the Voter Distance to Candidate Distance ratio ( $VDCD_i$ ) of party  $i$  defined as the ratio of the sum of the absolute distances between the voters of a party and the median voter of party  $i$  ( $MV_i$ ) to the sum of the absolute distances between the voters of a party and the median candidate of party  $i$  ( $MC_i$ ). Finally, the Relative Voter Distance ( $RVD_i$ ) of party  $i$  is defined as  $1 - VDCD_i$ , i.e.:

$$RVD_i = 1 - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n_i} |V_{ji} - MV_i|}{\sum_{j=1}^{n_i} |V_{ji} - MC_i|}$$

The aforementioned measures are almost identical to those used by Golder & Stramski. The main difference is that they focus on the congruence between the citizens and the government or between the citizens and the representatives in the legislature, while our focus is on the congruence between the voters of a party and the candidates of the party. On the other hand, our ‘many-to-many’ congruence measure enjoys many improvements compared with the one proposed by them. First, due to the lack of available data they had to assume that all legislative representatives from the same party share the same ideological position. Data from candidate and MP surveys (including the dataset from the Greek candidates analyzed in the current paper) indicate that this assumption is not always valid. In addition, having only one value for each party means that the distribution of the legislative representatives is a discrete distribution with a very limited number of values (equal to the number of parties in the legislature). Second, they had to estimate the position of the representatives of each party using the mean placement of the party by the top 40% of educated respondents of the voter survey. Although they argue on some advantages of their approach, we believe that positioning the candidates of a party by their responses (as we do in this paper) is better than using any other estimate as a proxy for their position.

Despite the aforementioned problems with the approach followed by Golder & Stramski we maintain that their concept of a ‘many to many’ congruence measurement is of great merit and we have tried to elaborate on it. We have done this in two ways. First, by asking the candidates of each party to self-position themselves, we (a) have avoided the problem of single point estimation per party and (b) we have registered the position of the candidates by themselves instead of trying to position them using what third parties believe about them. Second, although we agree with the idea that the ‘many to many’ congruence is higher when the distributions of voters and candidates are closest to each other, we are not using their measure of the sum of the absolute difference between the two distributions. Instead, we propose using the well-known two-sample Kolmogorov–

Smirnov test, which was created exactly for this purpose: to test whether two one-dimensional probability distributions differ. The statistic is very similar to the one proposed by Golder & Stramski but instead of using the sum it uses the supremum of the absolute differences between the two distributions:

$$KS_i = \sup_x |F_{V_i}(x) - F_{C_i}(x)|$$

where *sup* denotes the supremum function,  $F_{V_i}$  and  $F_{C_i}$  are the empirical distribution functions of the voters and candidates of party  $i$  respectively.

### Analysis of the items

We have used the following 15 statements to capture the political and ideological preferences of both voters and candidates. The questions were posed in the Greek 2015 voter and candidate surveys in an identical way as follows: “People hold different views on political issues. What do you think of the following?” and we have used a 5-point answering scale: 1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: neither agree nor disagree, 4: agree, and 5: strongly agree. In Table A1 we present the statements:

Table A1. Political preferences statements

Item	Statement
eco1	We should have more flexible forms of work in order to combat unemployment.
eco2	It must be possible to operate non-governmental, non-profit institutions of higher education.
eco3	The national health system can become more efficient through partial privatization.
imm1*	Immigrants are good for [the country’s] economy.
imm2	The requirements for asylum and citizenship must be tightened.
imm3*	The existence of multiculturalism in Greece is a positive phenomenon.
law1	There should be legislation to limit protests.
law2	People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.
law3	The police should use stricter enforcement measures to protect the property of citizens.
eumem1*	The probability of GRexit should not be considered as a disaster.
eumem2*	With the Memoranda we accumulate debts without any visible benefits.

eumem3	It is better for Greece to be in the European Union rather than outside.
eumem4*	The economy of Greece would have been better if we had our own currency instead of the Euro.
eumem5	Memoranda of Understanding with the Troika were necessary to avoid the bankruptcy of Greece.
eumem6*	We have every right to cancel the debt without consulting anyone else.

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\* item was reversed

Statements eco1-eco3 are used to capture economic policy preferences. If someone agrees with any of eco1-eco3, this agreement should indicate a preference towards right leaning economic policies. Statements imm1-imm3 are used to estimate attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy preferences. We have reversed the responses for items imm1 and imm3. As a result, larger values on any of imm1-imm3 indicate more negative attitudes towards immigrants. Statements law1-law3 are designed to measure preferences on law and order policies, with larger values indicating a preference for stricter law enforcement. The last six statements eumem1-eumem6 capture the opinion of the Greek voters and elites regarding the agreements with the Troika (memoranda) and attitudes towards the membership of Greece in the EU. The positions of the Greek voters on these six items are highly correlated and they form a unidimensional factor, i.e. pro-Memoranda voters are also pro-EU and anti-Memoranda voters are also anti-EU. Responses to eumem1, eumem2, eumem4 and eumem6 have been reversed; as a result, lower values on any of the eumem items indicate anti-Troika, anti-EU and anti-Memoranda positions.

In order to test if the items form a unidimensional scale we can use factor analysis. If all items load on a single factor, then the scale is unidimensional. In the first three columns we present the loadings of the items after running factor analysis without sampling weights (NW), with sampling weights (WW) and using polychoric correlation (PC). For ordinal items with different distributions, it is better to use Mokken scale analysis instead of factor analysis. Thus, in order to verify the results provided by factor analysis, we have included in the last column of the tables the output of Mokken scale analysis. For each item we present the item scalability coefficients  $H_i$ . As a rule of

thumb, in order to accept a set of items as a Mokken scale, the scalability coefficient for each item should be larger than 0.30. The scalability (homogeneity) coefficient H for the entire scale is presented near the bottom of the last column. Finally, the reliability of the scale is presented in the last row of each table with Cronbach's alpha (in the first column) and ordinal alpha using polychoric correlation in the third column.

Table A2. Economic policy items

	NW	WW	PC	MS
eco1	0,538	0,426	0,575	0.394
eco2	0,685	0,787	0,716	0.461
eco3	0,680	0,634	0,719	0.465
Variance %	0,407	0,401	0,454	
Scale H				0.439
alpha	0,664		0,708	

Table A3 Immigration policy items

	NW	WW	PC	MS
imm1	0,692	0,611	0,730	0.537
imm2	0,669	0,639	0,719	0.530
imm3	0,758	0,830	0,798	0.560
Variance %	0,500	0,490	0,562	
Scale H				0.542
alpha	0,746		0,793	

Table A4. Law and Order items

	NW	WW	PC	MS
law1	0,481	0,422	0,505	0.363
law2	0,492	0,573	0,493	0.343
law3	0,784	0,740	0,879	0.423
Variance %	0,363	0,352	0,424	
Scale H				0.378
alpha	0,599		0,643	

Table A5. EU and memoranda attitudes items

	NW	WW	PC	MS
eumem1	0,720	0,709	0,759	0.583
eumem2	0,699	0,571	0,757	0.606
eumem3	0,703	0,683	0,784	0.599
eumem4	0,787	0,767	0,827	0.618

eumem5	0,760	0,691	0,805	0.616
eumem6	0,719	0,673	0,780	0.596
Variance %	0,536	0,469	0,617	
Scale H				0.603
alpha	0,872		0,906	

All measures presented in Tables A2-A5 show that the four scales are unidimensional (all factor loadings are larger than 0.4 and all Hi values are larger than 0.3), and adequately reliable (the lowest polychoric alpha=0.643 is observed for the Law and Order scale which is based on three items and all other polychoric alpha values are higher). Thus, we can create four indexes. Each index is calculated as the average value of the items loading in each factor.

In order to measure the populist attitudes, we have included in both the voter and the candidate questionnaire a battery of the eight items presented in Table A6 and we have used the same 5-point Likert scale as before 1: Strongly disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Neither agree nor disagree, 4: Agree, 5: Strongly agree.

Table A6. Populist attitudes statements

Item	Statement
pop1	The politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people.
pop2	The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
pop3	The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
pop4	I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.
pop5	Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
pop6	What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.
pop7	Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the establishment.
pop8	Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-making.

The only item that had to be changed in the Greek Candidate Survey because it was not suitable for candidates was the question: ‘I would rather be represented by a



citizen than by a specialized politician’. This was changed to ‘People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician’.

In previous research based exclusively on data from the Greek Candidate Survey the reliability and unidimensionality of the populist attitudes scale have been tested. All the tests conducted on the candidate data indicate that a better scale is constructed after excluding item pop5. In a similar analysis on the voter data presented in Tables A7-A8, we find that pop5 appears with low factor loading (less than 0.4 when no sampling weights are used), low value of the H index (less than 0.3) of the Mokken scale analysis, and the overall alpha values (both Cronbach’s and polychoric) are increased when pop5 is removed. Thus, we have dropped this item and our populism index is constructed as the average value of the remaining seven populist attitude items.

Table A7. Populist attitudes (8 items)

	NW	WW	PC	MS
pop1	0,655	0,705	0,722	0.446
pop2	0,697	0,655	0,730	0.455
pop3	0,570	0,526	0,621	0.387
pop4	0,485	0,518	0,507	0.354
pop5	0,312	0,449	0,382	0.237
pop6	0,669	0,646	0,703	0.454
pop7	0,762	0,766	0,827	0.495
pop8	0,621	0,594	0,688	0.417
Variance %	0,373	0,379	0,437	
Scale H				0.411
alpha	0,815		0,851	

Table A8. Populist attitudes (7 items)

	NW	WW	PC	MS
pop1	0,657	0,705	0,724	0.474
pop2	0,712	0,675	0,749	0.492
pop3	0,571	0,526	0,622	0.411
pop4	0,479	0,508	0,502	0.369
pop6	0,656	0,629	0,689	0.468
pop7	0,751	0,759	0,813	0.516
pop8	0,634	0,608	0,700	0.451
Variance %	0,413	0,404	0,479	
Scale H				0.455
alpha	0,823		0,861	

