CHAPTER 5

Elite Surveys

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The phenomenon of populism poses many challenges to comparativists around the world, as outlined in the introduction to this volume. Due to different perspectives on the topic, researchers have especially struggled with conceptual clarity. In recent years, however, they have come to more agreement on how to define populism (e.g. Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser forthcoming; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012a; Panizza 2005). The emergence and success of populist parties is associated with some sort of crisis of democratic representation, which comes along with the dealignment of partisan attachments. This allows populist contenders to attract discontented voters with an anti-establishment appeal (Barr 2009). It is this kind of rhetoric – usually articulated around a discursive claim to represent "the people" against a hostile establishment frustrating their demands – that seems to unite populist parties (Laclau 2005).

In this chapter, we present the findings of two research projects designed to test if and how populist attitudes among political elites can be measured. Studying populist attitudes at the elite level may enhance our ability to assess the position of each political candidate within the political system. To do so, we define populism – in line with the ideational approach to the study of populism described in the introduction to this volume – as a formal discursive articulation dividing society into two relatively homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the people versus the elite (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser forthcoming), often resulting in the construction of a "thin-centred ideology" (Freeden 1998, 750). The exact content of this

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ideology depends on secondary elements that may be combined with such an appeal. From this perspective, populism may be related to many contents, structures, and strategies and can thus acquire antithetical political connotations.

One major advantage of such an approach is that it lends itself well to analysing the populist phenomenon in a comparative way. Based on this approach, empirical research has recently advanced in the task of measuring the complexities of populism, e.g. through textual analysis of political speeches or public opinion surveys to measure populist attitudes of voters (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014; Hawkins, Riding and Mudde 2012; Hawkins 2009). However, with the exception of key political figures like presidents, prime ministers, and political parties in general (Wiesehomeier 2015), the inclination of parliamentary elites towards populist attitudes has yet to be substantively explored, especially from a comparative perspective.

But why is it worth studying elites and what is the added value of this approach, given that existing analyses of manifestos and other discursive material seem to cover the supply side? Similar to studies on citizens' attitudes – i.e. the demand side – which have been the subject of sustained research, it is important to analyse the supply side of populist attitudes below the party level. While parties function as the intermediaries between citizens and the state, they are far from being unitary actors, and much has been written about the degree of ideological cohesion and party discipline of individual legislators, candidates or party activists (on Greece see Andreadis 2015; on Denmark see Hansen and Rasmussen 2013; on Latin America see Ruiz Rodríguez 2006). Hence, measuring populist attitudes on the individual (legislator or candidate) level enables us to gain insight into the within-party variation of the phenomenon, something that measures aimed at analysing populism at the meso-level, based on manifesto data or through expert surveys, fail to capture. Moreover, political elite surveys have the advantage to capture the discursive crystallizations of populist
attitudes across different types of party functionaries – i.e. rank-and-file and party leaders – while measures based on individual political speech data – which measure populism on the individual level as well – usually include only the most visible party representatives, like presidents, prime ministers, or party leaders. It is astonishing how little we know about political elites’ populist attitudes given that their study could offer a more accurate picture of how abstract ideological principles and formal electoral pledges (to be found in manifestos) shape the attitudes of real subjects who, by embodying the positions of their party in their everyday interaction with voters, act as its privileged interpreters, its influential agents and in-betweens.

This chapter sets out to close this gap by presenting and discussing two new datasets measuring populist attitudes through candidate and parliamentary elite surveys: the Greek Candidate Survey from 2015 and the Parliamentary Elites Survey from the University of Salamanca in Bolivia in 2015. Both datasets asked respondents (candidates and elected parliamentarians) to indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements on a five-point Likert scale, which we use to create an index of populist attitudes as detailed below. In what follows we first provide preliminary descriptive evidence on the distribution of this index of populism and its components among different political parties in these countries and its relationship with the ideological left-right divide. In analysing the data, this chapter also seeks to investigate populist attitude patterns and link them to other relevant political aspects. Our central aim is to determine whether we can use a theoretically informed battery of survey items and the resulting populism index to discriminate between populist and non-populist parties.

The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section, we elaborate on the definition of populism. In the third section, we discuss our measurement followed by a description of
the two datasets. We provide first descriptive empirical evidence on Greece and Bolivia in section four. Section five concludes.

What is Populism?

As mentioned above, for decades populism posed a conceptual challenge to comparative researchers. It has been largely defined along the lines of phenomenological typologies based on feature lists or core characteristics (e.g. organizational structure, social base) which led to many versions of populism distinguished by a series of adjectives or prefixes (Schedler 1996, 292) and finally to different case selections (see especially Weyland 2001). In recent years, however, researchers aiming at cross-regional comparisons have come to more agreement on how to define populism (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser forthcoming, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012b, and the introduction of this volume). Instead of focusing on narrow and region-specific definitions of populism, they follow a broader conceptualization based on an ideational approach. In line with the common reference to an anti-elite, anti-party, or anti-establishment discourse, and with an orientation charted by earlier definitions put forward by Canovan (1999) and Laclau (1980), populism is defined as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004, 543, italics in the original). This approach, nevertheless, is open to using narrower definitions of the concept to distinguish subtypes of the phenomenon. For example, the contents of such an, often, vague discourse do not form part of its conceptual core to the extent that they are determined through its articulation with other ideological, programmatic or personalistic elements (e.g. socialism, neo-liberalism, or charisma). Only the combination of a populist discourse with other ideological contents can determine the exact nature of the
antagonism between "the people" and "the elite" in a particular political setting and historical conjuncture. Thus, the recurrence of an anti-elite rhetoric and the central location of claims to be the party or the leader truly representing "the good people" seem indeed to unite all populist orientations. At the same time, other ideological elements articulated around this formal framework help to distinguish different forms of populism – such as left- or right-wing populism, neo-populism, or indigenous populism (Abts and Rummens 2007; Mudde 2004).

Such a definition of populism lends itself very well to a systematic measurement of populist phenomena. Based on this definition populism has been measured using several techniques of content analysis, e.g. holistic grading of speeches, sentence coding of party manifestos, or computerized content analysis of media texts (e.g. Hawkins 2009; Hawkins and Castanho Silva in this volume; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, and March in this volume). While these studies focused mainly on the supply side of populism – political parties and party leaders – other studies use the ideational approach to measure populist attitudes within the citizenry as a means to explain the rise and mobilization potential of populist parties in different regions of the world (see Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014; Hawkins, Riding and Mudde 2012). We combine the insights from these latter studies that measure populist attitudes on the individual level with the focus of the former studies on the supply side of populism to measure populist attitudes among political elites.

Only recently have researchers begun to transfer the items from public opinion surveys on populism to political elite surveys (Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2017; Stavrakakis, Andreadis, and Katsambekis 2016; Ruth and Ramírez Baracaldo 2015). This approach has significant potential advantages over existing measures on the supply side, namely, that it captures the within-party variation of the populist phenomenon and that it is not confined to the study of very prominent, and thereby visible party figures. Moreover, if we use
comparable items to inquire after populist attitudes within the political elite, we will be able to compare them with survey data measuring populist attitudes within the citizenry. The comparison of elite and public opinion surveys would enable us to test if elites engage in relations of polarizing trusteeship or moderating trusteeship with their constituents (see Kitschelt et al. 1999, 309-10), thereby either increasing or decreasing the importance of populism within political representation.

**Research Design**

*State of the Art: Measuring Populist Attitudes with Surveys*

Survey items to measure populist attitudes within the public have been developed and tested recently by Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012) to analyse populism in the United States as well as Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014) to analyse populist attitude in voter in the Netherlands. These authors developed a set of survey items that incorporate both the ideas and the language in which statements of the core ideas of populism are expressed. The first battery of these populist attitude items was included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University. The questionnaire included six items asking respondents to indicate their level of agreement with expressions that reference a struggle between the "pure" people and the "corrupt" elite. Additionally, Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012) used a similar battery of items in a subsample of 1,000 respondents from the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Elections Studies (CCES), an Internet survey conducted by Yougov/Polimetrix; and the 2008 Utah Colleges Exit Poll (UCEP), a sample of 950 respondents that was collected during the November 2008 general elections.

Building on the aforementioned studies, Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014) have tested a battery of items to measure populist attitudes and to investigate whether these attitudes can be linked with party preferences on a representative data set of 586 Dutch
respondents. This battery consists of three types of questions with a target to measure (1) populist attitudes, (2) pluralist attitudes, and (3) elitist attitudes. Based on the findings of this paper, populist attitudes can be measured by the six items presented in Table 5.1. The same items were deployed in both the 2015 Greek Candidate Survey (CCS) and the 2015 Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) survey managed by the University of Salamanca (USAL).²

<Table 5.1. NEAR HERE>

The 2015 Greek Candidate Study

The Greek Candidate Study is part of the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS), a joint multi-national project with the goal of collecting data on candidates running for national parliamentary elections in different countries using a common core questionnaire in a post-election candidate survey conducted in each country. CCS is conducted after the elections in order to collect data at the same period that data on voters are collected as part of national election studies. This means that in order to understand the findings presented in the following sections of this chapter, we should take into account that the candidates give their answer when they already know the electoral outcome and whether their political parties are in government or not.

In Greece, the Candidate Survey is usually run as a mixed-mode survey and the first mode is always a web-survey (Andreadis 2010) followed by face-to-face or telephone interviews. The data of these studies is available from the website of the Hellenic National

² The only item that had to be changed because it was not suitable for candidates or parliamentary elites was item POP4: "I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician" that was changed to "People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician."
Election Studies (http://www.elnes.gr) and has been used in many national and international publications (e.g. Andreadis 2012; Freire et al. 2014; Teperoglou, Chadjipadelis and Andreadis 2010; Teperoglou et al. 2014).

Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA 2015)

Since the late 1990s the PELA team conducts representative surveys of parliamentary elites in 18 countries in the region at the beginning of each legislative period. The surveys include questions about the values of legislators, their behaviour, as well as their opinion on concrete issues of the region and the socio-political panorama of the respective countries. They include questions on issues related to the quality of democracy, the ideological orientation of lawmakers and the position of their political parties and party leaders, their attitudes towards representation, democracy, and the economy. Moreover, the surveys include items on the organization of legislative parties and their social base.

The dataset has been used to study a wide range of topics like the ideological structuration of party systems and political competition along the left-right divide (Alcántara Sáez and Rivas 2007; Alcántara Sáez 2008; Kitschelt et al. 2010; Wiesehomeier 2010), the congruence between political elites and their constituents with respect to political issues or political values (Hawkins, Kitschelt and Llamazares 2010; Ruiz Rodríguez and García 2003; Saiegh 2009), the quality and structure of political representation (Carnes and Lupu 2015; Luna and Zechmeister 2010; Marenghi 2011), the nature of the executive-legislative relationship (García 2009), as well as legislative career paths and intra-party behaviour (Alcántara Sáez 2012; Carnes and Lupu 2015; Inácio and Magalhães Araújo 2011; Martínez Rosón 2012).

The survey is conducted based on structured, face-to-face interviews with parliamentarians. The PELA data base, as of now, consists of five waves with a set of continuously asked core questions as well as changing question batteries on specific topics.
The data is available through the project website of the Observatorio de Élites Parlamentarias en América Latina (http://americo.usal.es/oir/elites/bases_de_datos.htm). Among the first countries that included the six populist attitude items was Bolivia in Winter 2015. Hence, the PELA surveys provide a valuable dataset with which we can explore the relationship between populist attitudes and several other aspects of interest.

**Preliminary Descriptive Evidence from Greece and Bolivia**

The Greek CCS was conducted from mid-February to end of July 2015 and its initial target was to collect data from candidates of the seven parliamentary parties. Unfortunately, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) has never agreed to participate in the Greek Candidate Study. Likewise, Golden Dawn (GD) usually replies that all candidates share the same opinion, that of its leader, along the lines of the Führerprinzip. For the Greek Candidate Study 2015, we were able to find the email addresses and send invitations only to a very limited number of candidates running with KKE and Golden Dawn. As a result, we only have one completed questionnaire from KKE and five completed questionnaires from Golden Dawn candidates. Since these figures are not adequate for any statistical processing we have excluded these parties from the analysis. As a result, our target population is the group of all candidates running with the five following parties: Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), New Democracy (ND), The River (RIVER), Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), Independent Greeks (ANEL).

At this point, we want to highlight that the Greek dataset is based on responses by candidates. All major Greek political parties have the same number of candidates. Thus, a representative sample of candidates should include approximately the same number of candidates from each party. Elsewhere (Andreadis 2016), we estimate the response rate of the Greek CCS 2015 between 35.2% and 37.6% (depending on how the cases of unknown eligibility are used in the formula). We also demonstrate that the distribution of the
candidates in the sample is very similar to the corresponding distribution in the population with regard to i) gender and ii) their electoral districts. The elected MPs are slightly under-represented in the sample, but the gap is not very large (8.1% of the sample and 12.5% of the population). This difference is not important: for instance, if we study only the non-elected MPs, all parties will appear slightly more populist, but the difference of the populism index will be very small (less than 1.5%). The distribution per party is presented in Table 5.2.

Turning to Latin America, as mentioned before, Bolivia figures among the first countries within the PELA survey that included the six items on populist attitudes. Moreover, Bolivia has been frequently associated with the phenomenon of populism, especially since the rise of Evo Morales to the presidency in 2005 (Madrid 2008, Madrid 2011). Hence, we take the advantage here to provide a first analysis of the populist attitudes of legislators in the most recent legislative terms in Bolivia from 2015-2020.

The 2014 presidential and legislative elections in Bolivia was the second election under the new constitution from 2009 and the third consecutive election of Evo Morales for the presidency (Alpert, Centellas and Singer 2010; Centellas 2015). Morales, one of the most prominent populist presidents in Latin America, rose to power in 2005 with his party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) (de la Torre 2013; Madrid 2008). His initial campaign in 2005 capitalized on the deeply rooted discontent with traditional political elites, and his rise to power resulted in a complete restructuring of the party system (Crabtree 2013; Mayorga 2006). Throughout his previous terms, the political climate polarized and the MAS clashed with regional opposition parties, especially on issues of the nationalization of natural resources and political decentralization (Gray Molina 2010). Nevertheless, the MAS managed to win both the presidential and parliamentary election in 2014 with a comfortable majority.
of more than 60% of the vote. The main competitor of the MAS in the 2014 race (winning nearly 25% of the seats in the lower chamber) was the newly formed alliance *Unidad Demócrata* (UD) between the *Unidad Nacional* (UN), with its presidential candidate Samuel Doria Medina, and several regional opposition governors (Centellas 2015). The third party that won nearly 8% of the seats in the lower chamber in 2014 was the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC) with its presidential candidate Jorge Quiroga.

The PELA survey has been conducted in Bolivia in the end of 2015 and covers the legislators who serve in the legislative period from 2015-2020. Legislators have been randomly sampled and stratified by political party (see Table 5.3). For Bolivia, the sample includes 93 legislators, which equal 72% of the lower legislative chamber. The PELA surveys are based on face-to-face interviews. Nonresponse with respect to our items of interest is below 1% in our samples.

Although the two data sets discussed in this chapter follow a similar approach in measuring populist attitudes in political elites, the survey designs differ in two aspects. Since the Greek data is based on a candidate survey the sample includes both successful (i.e. elected) and unsuccessful (non-elected) candidates, while the PELA data is based on interviews with elected parliamentarians only. Nevertheless, according to Stavrakakis, Andreadis and Katsambekis (2016) the differences between elected and non-elected candidates are not large. Replicating the calculation of the populism index using only the sub-group of the 2015 Greek candidate sample that is created after the removal of the elected MPs, they get very similar results (all parties appear slightly more populist, but the differences are very small).

*Constructing a Populism Index for Political Elites*
Before we continue with the analysis of the results we need to verify that the six items we have used are closely related to each other in the two country samples. We need to test the internal consistency of the items mainly because the items have been tested so far only on voters. Indeed, this is the first time these items are used on candidates or parliamentarians, thus we need to check if the reliability of the scale when applied on voters remains intact when the scale is applied on candidates (Greek sample) or parliamentarians (Bolivian sample). Cronbach's alpha for the six items included in the Greek Candidate Study gets the value of 0.75, suggesting that the items have relatively high internal consistency. This value is similar to the value that Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014) have found in their study (0.82). Cronbach's alpha for the six items in the Bolivian sample, however, only reaches a value of 0.47 suggesting that the six items have a rather low internal consistency.

In order to decide which items we should include in our populist attitudes index in the two country samples, we run Mokken Scale Analysis using the R package mokken (van der Ark 2012; van Schuur 2003). In the remainder of this section, we discuss the results from these analyses separately for the two countries. Therefore, Table 5.4 includes the output for the Greek case and Table 5.5 for the Bolivian case.

The first column of Table 5.4 reports the item scalability coefficients Hi after running Mokken Scale analysis on all items. As can be seen, the coefficient of POP5 is lower than the usual rule of thumb for single items (0.3) and the overall H coefficient of the scale is 0.372, which is lower than the usual rule of thumb for H scales (0.4). This is why we re-ran the

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3 According to van Schuur (2003), for ordinal items, it is better to use Mokken scale analysis instead of factor analysis.
analysis excluding item POP5 (see the second column). As can be seen, the H scale improves when POP5 is dropped from the calculation, which is why we calculate the populism index for the Greek data based on the remaining five populist attitude items. For more details on the application of the method, see Stavrakakis, Andreadis and Katsambekis (2016).

<Table 5.5. NEAR HERE>

We proceed in a similar way for the Bolivian case. The Mokken scale analysis, this time however, identifies two scales, with three items consistently loading on the first scale and two items loading on a second scale. Following the same rule of thumb as before, we reach an H coefficient above 0.4 in both of these scales. The only item that does not consistently load on either of these two scales is POP6 "What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles." Hence, for the Bolivian data, we use two separate sets of items to calculate two sub-dimensions of populist attitudes. The first dimension taps into the component of people-centrism common among populist attitudes, with POP1 "The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people," POP2 "The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions," and POP4 "I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician." The second dimension, on the other hand, taps into the component of anti-elitism common in populist attitudes, with POP3 "The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people" and POP5 "Elected officials talk too much and take too little action." For a detailed discussion of the different substantive dimensions that have been subsumed under the concept of populism see the chapter by Castanho Silva et al. in this volume as well as Hawkins and Rovira (forthcoming) and Mudde (2004). We will come back to these patterns in our discussion below.

Comparing Political Parties Degree of Populism in Greece and Bolivia
As a result, from the analyses in the previous section, we construct an index of populism as the mean value of the five populist attitude items in Greece and three populist attitudes in Bolivia. As Figure 5.1 indicates, according to the Greek populism index the candidates of PASOK, ND and RIVER – parties generally assumed to be non-populist, something also consistent with our discursive/ideational framework – score below 3.5 while the candidates of both SYRIZA and ANEL – parties generally assumed to be populist, something also consistent with our framework – score over 3.5. ANEL candidates score higher than SYRIZA candidates on the populism index but the difference between these two parties is not significant. PASOK, ND and RIVER candidates do not differ significantly on the same index and form a common group. But this group (the candidates of PASOK, ND and RIVER) scores significantly lower on this scale and is significantly different from the group of SYRIZA and ANEL candidates.

<Figure 5.1. NEAR HERE>

While Figure 5.1 shows that the five-item additive index works very well in Greece, we still have not explained why POP5 does not. In Table 5.6 we compare the major partner in the current coalition government of populist parties (SYRIZA) with the major party of the opposition (ND), which is considered as non-populist. Except POP5, all other comparisons presented in Table 5.6 are significant at the 0.001 level, indicating that for all five items that were used to create the populist attitudes index, SYRIZA candidates score significantly higher than ND candidates. Again here, POP5 "Elected officials talk too much and take too little action" is an exception. It seems that it has been interpreted in a way that equates "elected officials" with members of the current government. Such an interpretation could explain the lower scores of SYRIZA candidates and the higher scores of ND candidates. It may be that SYRIZA candidates wanted to protect the ministers of their coalition government
(data were collected in a period when the Finance Minister Varoufakis was accused of spending most of his time giving interviews). At the same time, the interpretation could also explain the higher scores of ND candidates, because through their responses to this item they find a way to criticize the members of the current government.

Figure 5.2 shows the party differences with respect to the two sub-dimensions of populism in Bolivia. We find substantive party differences between MAS and UD legislators; legislators of the PDC, however, appear to be less consistent with respect to their populist attitudes on both the people-centrism as well as the anti-elite dimensions of populism. As expected, MAS legislators score consistently higher on populist attitudes highlighting the importance of "the people" (see left panel) - with a mean of 4.5 and a very low standard deviation of 0.52. The UD, on the other hand, scores consistently lower on people-centrism attitudes with a mean of 3.4 and a standard deviation of 0.75. Surprisingly, on average, MAS legislators have consistently lower populist attitudes with respect to the anti-elite dimension of populism compared to both the party system mean of 3.3 (sd=1.17) as well as the average legislator of the UD (mean=3.75, sd=0.91). Since these findings go against most of the current literature with respect to the degree of populism in Bolivia, we need to inspect these party differences in more detail (de la Torre 2013; Madrid 2011; Webber 2010).

In order to explain the results for Bolivia, we may also inspect the differences on the item level (including all six items) for the president's party MAS and the main opposition party UD (see Table 5.7). We find that MAS legislators are significantly more populist with respect to how much politicians need to follow the will of the people (POP1), if people
should make the most important policy decisions (POP2), and if people can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician (POP4). They are less so with respect to the differences between the elite and the people (POP3) and concerning the attitude that elected officials talk too much and take too little action (POP5), which is where UD legislators reach consistently higher scores compared to MAS legislators. Consequently, while the reference to "the people" as well as "the will of the people" seems to be at the core of MAS legislator's populist appeal, 10 years of experience in government may have tamed the anti-elite and anti-government elements of the populist ideology of these legislators. Hence, the findings highlight the bottom up character and strong focus on "the people" of the MAS that started out as a heterogeneous social movement in the 1990s and early 2000s (Crabtree 2013; de la Torre 2013). The findings of the low anti-elite stance of MAS legislators also resonate with data from populist discourse analysis showing that the intensity of the populist discourse of Evo Morales decreased considerably from his first to his second term (Hawkins and Kocijan 2013; Hawkins 2009) and hints to a moderating pull that experience in power may have on populist actors (Abts and Rummens 2007; Schedler 1996). It also falls in line with the findings from the chapter by Singer, Andreadis, Hawkins, and Rovira Kaltwasser in this volume, which show a weakening connection over time between the populist attitudes of Bolivian voters and their preference for MAS. Hence, our findings point to an important intervening variable that has been discussed in the populism literature for quite some time and needs to be taken into account, especially with respect to the viability of the populist discourse: the government or opposition status of political actors (Heinisch 2003; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012b).

Table 5.7. NEAR HERE

Conclusion
In this chapter, we explore if the measurement of populist attitudes in citizens may travel to political elites as well. We find that they do but that they show different patterns both across countries and across parties. Drawing from earlier studies on populist, elitist and pluralist attitudes in voters (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014; Hawkins, Riding and Mudde 2012) we adapted a set of survey statements and deployed them in the Greek module of the CCS and the Bolivian sample of the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America surveys (PELA). Our exploratory analyses show that most of the six populist attitude items proposed in the literature consistently construct a single scale in the Greek case, while we identified two sub-dimensions of populist attitudes in the case of Bolivia, where we find differences with respect to people-centrism (POP1, POP2, and POP4) as well as anti-elite elements (POP3 and POP5) in the populist discourse to be the most consistent aspects across parties.

These different patterns across countries led us to compare political elites on the level of political parties in more detail. Here again, we found that legislators from different political parties show a clear pattern in the Greek case but a more diverse pattern in Bolivia. As expected, SYRIZA and ANEL, consistently score higher on populism as their traditional counterparts (PASOK, ND and RIVER) do. In Bolivia, however, we find legislators from the party of President Evo Morales – MAS – to be the least populist with respect to anti-elite attitudes, while legislators of the two opposition parties UD and PDC score consistently higher on this dimension. On the contrary, we find that MAS legislators score considerably higher on those items that focus on the populist subcomponent of people-centrism (POP1, POP2, and POP4) compared to the two opposition parties. Both patterns resonate with MAS history that is grounded in its bottom-up development from a social movement to a long-term government party (Crabtree 2013).

Our findings highlight several interesting insights and new avenues for future research: First, while we find consistent populist attitudes among the elite, these do not
necessarily consist of the same populist items identified in other contexts for citizens. More research is necessary to identify both regional specific patterns of the populist discourse and patterns that distinguish the elite from the citizenry in their attitudes towards populism. Second, and related to the latter point, our analysis across both cases highlights the importance of government status and its relation to the "anti-elite" component of populist discourse. Our results indicate in both cases that anti-elite attitudes are considerably higher in opposition legislators than in government legislators. Even the short experience of SYRIZA in Greece already highlights that items like POP5 (elected officials talk too much and take too little action) undermine the function of a governing party in supporting the government. A finding that arises even more so in the Bolivian case, where the MAS has been in government for three consecutive presidential terms. Several studies on populism have shown that a populist appeal may be well suited to compete (successfully) in elections but less suited for the time consuming and compromise prone day to day business of governing. Hence, future research needs to address the possibility that populist attitudes in political elites may vary over time conditional on either political campaign logic or government status.

This chapter presented a first glimpse at these emerging datasets on populist attitudes in Europe and Latin America. With the completion of more datasets, more substantive comparisons will become possible and more conclusive support for what seems like a promising avenue for future research will hopefully be established.
References


_Electoral Studies_ 38: 94-97.


Chapter 5 - Tables

Table 5.1: Populist Attitude Items

| POP1 | The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people |
| POP2 | The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions |
| POP3 | The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people. |
| POP4 | I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician |
| POP5 | Elected officials talk too much and take too little action |
| POP6 | What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles |

Sources: Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012:8-9) and Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014:1331)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Candidates (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYRIZA</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIVER</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANEL</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.3: Distribution of Respondents per Party, PELA Survey 2015-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Respondents (%)</th>
<th>Seats (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PELA 2015-2016.
Table 5.4: Output of Mokken Scale Analysis – Greece

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>6 items</th>
<th>5 items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POP1</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP2</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP3</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP4</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>0.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP5</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP6</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.442</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.5: Output of Mokken Scale Analysis – Bolivia

### Mokken Scale Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item coefficients</th>
<th>People-Centrism</th>
<th>Anti-Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 items</td>
<td>2 items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP1</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP2</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP3</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.413</td>
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</table>
Table 5.6: SYRIZA/ ND Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POP1</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>.627</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP2</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>.832</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>1.059</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP3</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>.825</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP4</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>.862</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>.985</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP5</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>.883</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>.914</td>
<td>-2.60</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP6</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>.964</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Greek Candidate Study 2015
Table 5.7: MAS/UD Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>MAS N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>UD N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POP1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP2</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-1.78</td>
<td>0.0795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP4</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-3.19</td>
<td>0.0020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP6</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.5135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PELA 2016.
Figure 5.1

A dot plot showing the mean and 95% CI of a Populism Index for different political parties:

- PASOK
- ND
- RIVER
- SYRIZA
- ANEL
Figure 5.2