

**«Elites' and Voters' attitudes towards austerity policies and their
consequences in Greece and Portugal»**

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Abstract

Greece and Portugal are among the European countries most affected by the International financial crisis that began in the US (2007) but soon had very severe consequences also in Europe, with the so-called debt crisis and euro crisis. Namely, both Greece (2010) and Portugal (2011) were obliged to request loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and/or the European Union to deal with the debt crisis and with financial disequilibrium in public finances. Greece is in a severe recession for around five years now, and Portugal has been in recession since 2011, but especially in 2012. However, the way to deal with these situations politically has been described, namely in the national and international mass media, to be very different in Greece and Portugal. Namely, mass protests have been said to have been much more frequent, violent and widespread in Greece than in Portugal. Moreover, political consensus in Portugal (between the Centre-left, PS: Socialist Party, and the right-wing government, i.e., by the liberal PSD and the conservative CDS-PP) have been said to have been very different vis-à-vis the higher levels of political polarization in Greece (between the Centre-left, PASOK, and the Centre-right, ND, with a notable upsurge in the radical left, Syriza, and the extreme right). Using data concerning both Prospective MPs/Candidate surveys (CCS survey), and Voter surveys (Hellenic National Election Study/ELNES; Portuguese «Elections, Leadership and Accountability» Research Project) which for both Greece and Portugal included a specific battery of questions concerning “the economic crisis, austerity policies and their effects”, we will try to see in what extent the situation is different in Greece and Portugal by relating elites’ and voters’ attitudes towards the bailout agreements, the austerity policies and their effects, as well as blame attribution.

Keywords: Portuguese and Greek bailout; financial and economic crisis; political representation; legislative candidates and voters

Introduction

The current sovereign debt crisis in the euro-periphery and in Southern Europe in particular, certainly creates unprecedented pressures on existing political systems, which possibly lead to the accentuation of national particularities and differences. Both the Greek and the Portuguese governments have been forced to request the activation of emergency funds (bailout packages that rely on EU-IMF loans) and implement harsh economic measures. The consequences of the economic crisis on the political arena of the two countries have contributed to the creation of a rather unique political landscape in their political history, at least since the consolidation of democracy.

In Portugal the former Prime Minister José Sócrates resigned in March 2011 and on the 5th of June 2011 a so-called “Post-Bail-out Election” (Magalhães 2012a) took place. The lowest-ever for a legislative election turnout (58%), the strong but not humiliating defeat (third worst result ever, but above 1985 and 1987) of the Socialist Party (PS) which nevertheless did not allow the centre-right party (Social Democratic Party/PSD) to reach a clear majority, and thus need to form a coalition government with the Social and Democratic Center – Popular Party (CDS-PP), and the party system fragmentation which remained unchanged compared to 2009 (the effective number of parliamentary parties was around 3) can be considered as some of the main characteristics of the Portuguese 2011 election outcome (Magalhães 2012a; Freire and Santana-Pereira, 2011). According to those accounts and also the 2011 Portuguese National Election Study (ICS-UL), the voters above all blamed the incumbent PS for bad performance in macroeconomic management, even if they also acknowledged the impact of the international financial crisis as an element that somehow mitigated PS’ responsibilities in the Portuguese debt crisis, but did not show a turn to the right in terms of their policy preferences and underlying value orientations. The

PSD, on the contrary, showed a significant shift towards the neoliberal right in terms of policy orientations, well beyond the constraints of the Troika agreement.

For the first time in the history of the Third Republic (with the exception of a brief interlude in 1989-1990), Greece has been governed by two successive coalition governments. The first somewhat unorthodox (both in terms of ideological span and the composition of the cabinet) coalition government has been formed in November 2011 after the resignation of the former Prime Minister George Papandreou (PASOK: center-left), led by the non-elected technocrat Lukas Papademos, a former deputy president of the European Central Bank. This government of “national unity” (PASOK with the centre-right party of New Democracy /ND and the far-right party of Popular Orthodox Rally/LAOS) as it has been announced led the country to the national elections of 6th of May 2012. It was a unique “earthquake election” for the Greek political and electoral history (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis 2012). It has been recorded one of the highest levels of electoral volatility in Europe; the losses for the ruling socialist party of PASOK have been massive, while the percentages of the small left party of the coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) exploded. No government was then formed, due to the lack of a clear winning majority, and the country went to the polls again on the 17th of June 2012. After this last election, the plurality winner, ND, formed a coalition government with PASOK and a small left party (Democratic Left/DIMAR). The latter withdrew its support at the time of the writing of this paper-almost one year after the formation of this ruling coalition.

This ongoing transformation of the political and electoral landscape cannot leave the main political actors, namely the political elites and the political institutions of the two countries unaffected. From 2010 when the crisis first became critical, trust in political institutions and politicians assumed a downward trend in both countries. In Greece it is observed an unprecedented image of extreme and rapid delegitimation for political parties, as well as main executive and representative institutions (government and parliament)

(Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2012). In Portugal, survey results (fieldwork in mid-2008 and end of 2012-13, under the auspices of the “Elections, leadership and accountability” research project, CIES-IUL, directed by one of the authors of the present paper) also show a pronounced decline in trust in political institutions (parties, government, parliament, the presidency) between 2008-2012, and a huge decline in terms of satisfaction with democratic performance (Freire, 2013a).

According to the findings of the European Social Survey (ESS), in the summer of 2011 (5th round ESS) those who answered “no trust at all for the politicians” at the 10-points scale reached 48% in Greece (compared to 18% in 2003, 15% in 2005 and 23% in 2009), while in Portugal 34% (compared to 17% in 2003, 24% in 2005 and 29% in 2009). The fact that trust towards the political class has dropped notably should not be only related to the severe austerity measures and the deterioration of personal economic conditions. The financial and economic crisis have revealed the poor management of both the governments and the administrations, and have also been showing governments / political parties governing against not only their electoral commitments but also their usual fundamental policy orientations. Although in variable degrees, these elements apply for all Southern European countries, and has also contributed towards an increasing dissatisfaction with the parties, in particular, and the disillusion with politics, in general (Bosco and Verney 2012: 134).

Thus, a central question is how the Greek and Portuguese political elites, as well as their constituents, perceive the various dimensions of the crisis we have been living since 2008-2009, namely the Troika agreements, the austerity policies, their social and political consequences, and blame attribution. Can we identify points of convergence between the political elites and the voters? Are there different levels of congruence (or lack of it) between voters and their representatives both across countries and across parties within each country? These are some of the main questions that we try to approach in this study.

Before proceeding we should clarify our objectives. In this paper we seek to provide an empirical investigation of the attitudes of the political personnel (candidates to legislative elections) and the voters of the two Southern European countries that were obliged to request loans from the IMF and the EU towards various aspects of the economic crisis and the bailout agreements. It is a case study of political representation aiming to shed light to attitudes that nowadays constitute one of the most contradictory debates both in political and economic terms. Two central questions here are the following. First, to what extent do the Greek and Portuguese candidates and voters share similar attitudes in terms of the bailout agreements and the austerity measures, and what can explain the possible differences. Second, how congruent are voters and their representatives in each country in those evaluations, and what can explain the differential levels of congruence (across parties and countries).

The empirical research strategy of our paper focuses on two main objectives. The first and overarching goal is to examine whether the situation is different between the two countries by relating elites' and voters' attitudes towards the bailout agreements with the Troika (MoU: Memorandum of Understanding), and blame attribution. We attempt to offer answers to the questions of whether there are points of congruence between the Greek and the Portuguese political elites towards the MoU and its effects, between the voters in each country and between the candidates and the electorate of each country. Another main goal is to examine if there any significant mismatches between the politicians and the voters towards the austerity policies, their effects and blame attribution.

The next section is focused on the conceptual framework and the main hypotheses of our study. In that second section, we also include some discussion points of some national specific contexts that we consider as important factors that should be taken into account in the comparison of the two countries. In third section we make a short

presentation of the data and methods that we will be using. The fourth section of the paper deals with the findings of our study. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.

Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses

In an attempt to further explore and frame our research design we face a rather problematic situation given the fact that the relevant literature is very limited. Previous research efforts for both countries (and for all Southern periphery) have been focused in the analysis of the political consequences of this crisis on voting behavior and electoral choices (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2012; Tsatsanis and Teperoglou 2013), with a focus on economic voting (Magalhães 2012b; Kosmidis 2013), and party identification (Tsatsanis and Teperoglou 2013). Another set of the literature is related to mass protest and measures of social unrest (e.g. Rüdiger and Karyotis, 2013a and 2013b). There are also several studies about how the political elites frame, exploit and manage crisis in general, and economic crisis in particular (Boin et al, 2005 and 2009; 't Hart and Tindall, 2009a and 2009b).

Our study is the first -at least to our best knowledge to attempt to examine the linkage between political elites and voters in harsh economic times by providing a comprehensive view of the perceptions about the Troika agreement, the austerity policies that followed and their effects for both citizens and the political elites.

However, the conceptual framework of this paper could be built upon three main theoretical paradigms: first, the political representation paradigm (and the related 'responsible party model'); second, the theory of democracy and the functions of representation and accountability; third, theoretical perspectives about crisis exploitation and framing, economic voting and the attribution of blame. The first one overlaps with the relevant literature about political representation and the so-called "responsible party model", in which the electorate selects from one or two parties based on their policy

promises and performance (e.g Dalton 1985; Holmberg 1997; Pierce 1999; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999; Wessels 2007; Freire and Belchior 2013). The model is based on several principles. Political parties are the core mechanism in the process of democratic representation. Parties must offer distinct policy options or programs and voters should be informed sufficiently to award or punish the incumbent parties based on their performance (Stokes and Miller 1962). Furthermore, according to the model the members of a party's parliamentary delegation should vote as a single bloc in parliament and the parties exercise control over the government. The electorate has an indirect control over the government and the individual legislators (Dalton 1985: 270). The "responsible party model" posits some features about the linkage of parties and voters. These are: 1) electors share various packages of issue positions; 2) electors compare their issue positions with the ones presented by the political competitors in each election; 3) electors vote for the party which presented the issue package which is closest to their own; and finally, 4) once elected, the party officials in parliament, remain united and try harder to enact the issue package (they presented to the electorate) into public policy (Pierce 1999: 9). Therefore, the conditions of the "responsible party model" are both from the supply side and the demand side of electoral competition. Parties should provide alternative set of programs for the issues that the country is facing and voters need to choose parties either on their retrospective evaluations of their record in government or prospective evaluations of their policy platforms (Marsh and Norris 1997: 154). The model has been subjected to criticism. From an empirical point of view it has been criticized in respect to the knowledge that voters should have for party manifestos and thus, to the possibility of influencing the election result. It has also been criticized from a more normative perspective as being a "populist theory of democracy", sacrificing basic democratic values (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999:16; see also Freire, 2013b). Notwithstanding the critics, the merit of this theoretical approach is important. Thomassen and Schmitt highlighted it as following "the merit of

this model is that at least it helps to study the role of different actors in the process of political representation in a systematic way and that each of the requirements of the model can be used as a benchmark to evaluate the effectiveness of a particular aspect of the system of political representation” (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999:16). Following “the responsible party model”, the study of congruence between the electors and the representatives regarding the bailout agreement and the austerity measures is a crucial element to understand the quality of political representation. A central assumption is that the higher the level of congruence between voters and candidates, the higher the probability of a well-functioning representative democracy.

It is well known in public policy theory how crises (such as disasters or political scandals, but also deep economic crisis like the one we are living) can be and are ‘exploited’ and ‘framed’ (Boin et al, 2009 and 2005; ‘t Hart and Tindall, 2009a and 2009b). When faced with a crisis, political actors produce different perceptions, interpretations and *frames* to understand and deal with it.ⁱ These perceptions, interpretations and *frames* are constrained by the actors’ values, interests and positions. Taking this into account, three situations are possible. Crisis is defined as a non-event, i.e., there is a denial that the events represent more than an *unfortunate accident* (Boin et al, 2009: 84). Thus, here we have a *No crisis* frame (Type 1), which imply that there is *no one to be blamed* and the policy consequences are small or null (*business as usual*). The second frame (Type 2) occurs when there is acknowledgment of the crisis, but it is understood as a *critical threat* to the collective good embodied in the status quo, and thus there is «a predisposition to defend the agents (incumbent office-holders) and tools (existing policies and organizational practices) of that status quo against criticism (Boin et al, 2009: 84) This is the situation that can perhaps best be applied to the incumbent socialist governments in Greece and Portugal, in 2012 and 2011 respectively. Finally, the Frame Type 3 is when the crisis is understood as a *critical opportunity*, usually by the opposition, and thus there is the tendency to focus the blame on status quo agents and

dysfunctional policies, and try to mobilize support for their removal and/or substantial change. This is the situation that can perhaps best be applied to the right-wing opposition (PSD and CDS-PP), in Portugal in 2011 and afterwards, but also to the right-wing (especially ND) and left-wing (especially Syriza) opposition, in Greece 2012.

As regards public support, conventional wisdom holds that public opinion will oppose austerity policies brought on by the IMF (and hence the EU). Indeed, those policies – cuts in salaries and social provisions, increases in taxes – are by nature unpopular, and thus most of the politics of reform literature assume that people would oppose these reforms (Rodrik, 1996; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, Sachs 1990, Skidmore 1977). However, several authors have shown that the painful reforms and the government embarking on them are not always opposed by the public. The reasons for this are multiple. People might support austerity reforms because they believe that hard times now would be followed by prosperity in the future; or because they reason that the bad times they experience is not the government fault (Stokes 2001; Stokes, 1996; Fernandez-Albertos, 2006). A sense of crisis may lead voters to favor reforms (Grindle and Thomas 1991, Keeler 1993, Nelson 1992, Remmer 1991), and voters might wonder whether the outcome would not have been worse in the absence of a program.

If sometimes people do not reject the politics of austerity associated with intervention, and the government implementing them, what could explain variation? A first obvious reason is the perception of the culprit for bad times. Pop-Eleches (2009), for example, shows that in Latin America the roots of the debt crisis were widely perceived as being of an external nature, which resulted in a lower willingness to bear the economic costs of adjustment policies; while in Eastern Europe the domestic roots of the economic crises were much less disputed, and, therefore, voters were more likely to support or at least tolerate neoliberal reforms despite their considerable short-term costs. As Hayo (2005) shown, Koreans – who blame their won system of crony capitalism as the cause for

the economic problems - did not put much blame on the IMF bailout conditions for the worsening of the economic crisis. Instead, these Koreans endorse the intervention as the most effective solution to their economic problem.

A first research question, then, is to understand the perception of Portuguese and Greek citizens as regards the crisis, the MoU, and the austerity policies – do they see them as mainly the fault of their own government or mainly caused by external factors? An inch of answer could be found in the literature mentioned above. Stokes found out that, when unemployment is high (which is definitively the case in both Greece and Portugal), people would tend to reject the reforms and the government implementing them: ‘unemployment is such a catastrophic event that when people think the probability of losing their jobs is high, they interpret it unambiguously as bad news and held the government responsible’ (Stokes, 2001: 26). Thus we can expect that:

Hypothesis 1: A majority of Portuguese and Greek citizens reject the austerity packages and blame mainly the government for their negative results (H1)

However, we should also consider for our analysis the fact that more severe measures are implemented in Greece than in Portugal. Greece is experiencing the most severe cuts in wage reductions and pensionsⁱⁱ. Most of the mass demonstrations and protests for the severe austerity measures in Greece ended up with violence both from the protesters and the authorities, with the exception of the spontaneous protest movement (that mirrored analogous mobilizations in Spain and in Portugal) dubbed the “desperate generation” or the “*indignandos*”. The growing political unrest in Greece fed fears of a generalized social breakdown. In Portugal the manifestations were more peaceful, and less frequent. Thus, our second hypothesis reads as follows:

Hypothesis 2: we expect in general the “anti-bailout” camp to be stronger in Greece than in Portugal, both at the elite and at the voters level (H2)

In comparing the two countries, other contextual differences should be taken into account. One important difference is that in Portugal, the negotiations for the bailout took place directly with the PS government, but the PSD and CDS-PP were also significantly involved. The current prime-minister and PSD leader, Coelho, agreed to participate, following the EU's insistence of formal agreement of the memorandum among all three largest Portuguese parties (the PS, the PSD and the CDS-PP). This request did not produce any conflict –as in Greece– and the memorandum of agreement was subscribed by all three parties.

In Greece, it was the PASOK government, in the hands of which the debt bomb exploded and which negotiated the terms of the first bailout deal in 2010. By that time, the leader of the main opposition party of New Democracy (ND), Antonis Samaras was against the memorandum and was calling for snap elections. He clearly stated several times “I am not going to consent to this recipe that has been proven wrong” (e.g <http://euobserver.com/economic/32388>). Therefore, the debate about the terms of the memorandum and whether an alternative plan should be implemented was dominant in the Greek political arena and was not only addressed by the smaller (and mainly) leftist parties. For the purposes of our paper and its hypotheses, it is necessary to highlight that the main argument by the party of ND was that the first MoU (negotiated and signed by PASOK ruling party at that time) was a terrible mistake. Back at the end of 2011, Samaras insisted on an alternative plan, a different government with the credibility to implement it and a transition to a new rescue plan given the fact that the initial plan had failed. The second MoU was completed under Papademos government, the so-called government of “national unity”. ND gave a vote of confidence to the Papademos government and contributed to it with two ministers. The main slogan by ND, PASOK and DIMAR for the national elections of June 2012 was the renegotiation of MoU. Now, the party of ND is the main party of the coalition government (with PASOK) and they have adopted severe austerity

measures. Given these particularities, in our study we consider that ND and PASOK are the parties in favour of the MoU even though the first MoU was signed only by the socialists.

In comparing the two countries, we should also take into account some other national specific context characteristics related to the financial and economic crisis and the bailout agreements. The first one is related to the different patterns of consensualist and majoritarian positions assumed by the Greek and Portuguese political elites. Back in November 2011 the widely desired “consensus” between the party of New Democracy and PASOK concerning the need to pursue restrictive economic policies has proven to be far more elusive in relation to Portugal (Teperoglou & Andreadis 2012). The attempts of Greek politicians to strike some kind of compromise that would allow the present parliament to support a new government and to avoid a snap election in the midst of negotiations to secure the continuation of external funding for Greece attracted a lot of media attention and also preoccupied international policy circles. How can we explain these different patterns? At this point it is useful to remember some of the main findings of the studies of Lijphart and others for the two countries. Focusing on Southern Europe, the main conclusion was that Portugal is consensual and unitary, while Greece is an “eccentric” case of majoritarianism (Lijphart et al. 1988: 17 and 19; see also Bruneau et al, 2001). The changes which were occurring in South Europe were reinforcing the majoritarianism of already majoritarian regimes (namely Greece and Spain) and, similarly, were reinforcing the consensualism of the already consensual systems (namely, Portugal and Italy). Thus, Greece and Portugal were much more likely to move farther away from each other than to draw together (Lijphart et al. 1988: 22) Nevertheless, Portugal followed in the end a rather different path (Bruneau et al. 2001; Freire, 2007). Greece is an exception as it stands in the same group with the British-heritage countries at the majoritarian end, reaching the remarkable mean of 96.9 (see Lijphart 1999: 110-111). In conclusion, Greece used to

represent one of the most prominent examples of majoritarianism, while in Portugal there is marked move away from the initial post-authoritarian model of consensus democracy. Once the political system was stabilized and consolidated, there have been clear trends towards a more majoritarian system (Bruneau et al, 2001; Freire, 2007). Nevertheless, any attempt to include the two countries in the same group is bound to fail to capture the much more dynamic aspects of the Portuguese system. Therefore, we our third hypothesis reads as follows:

Hypothesis 3: we expect a lower dispersion of the attitudes towards the austerity measures and the bailout agreement among the Portuguese candidates (and voters) compared to the Greeks (H3)

A fourth hypothesis relate to the variation across voters according to their party identification. As noted by Hayo (1999), party identification to a party that was in power when the IMF was called in affects attitudes towards reforms. This is because citizens who identify for a party which called for IMF intervention, feel partially responsible and thus rationalize this choice by viewing the outcome positively. In Portugal both PS, PSD and CDS-PP signed the Memorandum, while in Greece the first MoU was signed by PASOK and the second one was also supported by ND (as partner of the coalition government of “national unity”), this reasoning is likely to hold true for them as well.

H4 - Citizens who identify with the PS, PSD and CDS-PP in Portugal or with PASOK and ND (and also with DIMAR)ⁱⁱⁱ in Greece, are less likely to blame Troika policies vis-à-vis the citizens that identify with left parties (BE and PCP/CDU) in Portugal and with Syriza and KKE, as well as with the extreme-right (ANEL, LAOS, XA) parties in Greece.

However, as the time passed since the signature of the MoU and the results of austerity policies (rise in unemployment, drop in income, cuts in social benefits and more difficult / expensive access to public services) are more deeply felt, we should expect discontent with austerity policies to grow significantly. That is why we expect the following:

H5.1: *In Portugal, the right-wing candidates (PSD and CDS-PP) are the less congruent with their constituents, vis-à-vis the left-wing candidates (PS, BE and PCP) and their voters, because rightwing citizens like their leftwing peers have a mainly negative evaluation of austerity policies and their effects.*

H5.2: *In Greece the center-right and the center-left candidates (ND and PASOK) are the less congruent with their constituents, vis-à-vis both the left-wing (Syriza, KKE, DIMAR) and the extreme right (ANEL, LAOS, XA) candidates and their voters, because the center-right and the center-left citizens like their radical left and extreme right peers have a mainly negative evaluation of austerity policies and their effects.*

Candidates (i.e., prospective MPs) and MPs' opinions vis-à-vis the reforms are crucial, too, as the political ability of the government to carry out its program depends on the willingness of the MPs (at least of the majority) to let it pass. Therefore, which attitudes towards reform and IMF do we expect from them, as compared to the voters? We know that MPs tend to adopt more extreme policy positions on both the left and the right of the ideological line (see, for example Miller et al. 1999) and studies for the Portuguese case confirm this trend (Freire and Belchior 2013; De Giorgi, Moury and Ruivo 2013).

In line with these findings, it makes sense to argue that the political elite would also hold attitudes about IMF and the intervention which are more extreme than those of the citizens. Thus we have:

H6.1: *In Portugal, a larger proportion of mainstream (PSD, CDS-PP and PS) candidates than voters support the intervention; while a larger proportion of candidates than voters from radical parties is against it.*

H6.2: *In Greece, a larger proportion of mainstream (ND and PASOK) candidates than voters support the intervention; while a larger proportion of candidates than voters from radical parties is against it.*

Data and Methods

As Marsh and Norris noted “a comprehensive exploration of representation requires data from both those who are supposed to represent and those who are to be represented” (Marsh and Norris 1997: 159). The empirical investigation of this paper rests upon different research projects but using strictly comparable data both across countries (Greece and Portugal) and across levels (Prospective MPs/Legislative Candidates and Voters). We are using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) conducted in both countries (for the Portuguese and Greek candidates running for the 2011 and 2012 national elections accordingly). The Portuguese Candidate Survey, concerning the 2011 national elections, but fieldwork between 2012 and 2013, was conducted under the auspices of the of the research project «Elections, Leadership and Accountability: Political representation in Portugal, a longitudinal and comparative perspective» (FCT: PTDC/CPJ-CPO/119307/2010)» directed by André Freire (with José Manuel Leite Viegas and Ana Belchior) at CIES-IUL^{iv}. The final number of interviews is N = 257 (PSD: 56; CDS-PP: 62; PS: 45; PCP/CDU: 42; BE:52), but the data is weighted by party list and gender to correct for deviances vis-à-vis the Universe (1150 from 5 parties). A mail questionnaire was mainly used as the instrument for data collection (although some questionnaires were also collected through face-to-face interviews). Four reminders (with around 1 or 2 months interval each) were sent to legislative candidates.

The Greek Candidate Study has been conducted by the Laboratory of Applied Political Research, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, directed by Theodore Chadjipadelis Ioannis Andreadis and Eftichia Teperoglou as a web survey using epolls.gr (Andreadis, 2010). This was the third candidate study in Greece in a series that started in 2007 (Andreadis and Chadjipadelis, 2007), and continued in 2009 (Andreadis, 2012). Candidate MPs and MPs received an initial invitation at the beginning of October 2012. Apart from

the initial invitation, two more email reminders have been sent - only to candidates who had not completed the questionnaire until the time of the reminder. Given the large size of the questionnaire and the usually busy schedule of the respondents, the Greek Candidate Survey research team has decided to allow sufficient time (about three weeks) between the reminders. The first reminder was sent in late October 2012 and the second around 20 November 2012. The online questionnaire was available until the first days of December 2012. The dataset consists of the 308 completed questionnaires (DIMAR: 83, ND: 61, PASOK: 108 and SYRIZA: 51 ANEL: 3 XA:2^v

The voter studies that we are using are the first Greek National Election Study/ELNES, while for Portugal we analyze the data taken from the voter study components of the research project mentioned above for Portugal.

The Greek National Election Study/ELNES was conducted as a mixed-mode survey in the period between 19 October 2012 and 5 January 2013. The sample was selected randomly by area proportional to total phone population. Half of the sample was designed to be collected online. The selected respondents were called on the phone and they were asked to provide their email address if they wanted to participate in a web survey conducted by the Laboratory of Applied Political Research, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. These email addresses have been used into the epolls.gr web survey system. The other half of the sample was designed to be collected by face-to-face interviews. For the face-to-face sample, additional weight was given to people from rural areas, aged ≥ 55 years and with lower educational levels (taking into consideration the limited access and use of the Internet of these groups). The final dataset consists of 531 respondents to the web survey and 500 respondents to the face-to-face interviews.

The Portuguese voter study was fielded in 2012 by GFK (September – October) as a multi-stage probabilistic sample (N= 1209) representative of the adult population living

in the mainland, with face-to-face interviews. The sample was weighted by region, sex, gender and education (to correct for any deviances vis-à-vis the 2011 Census data).

Besides using similar variables to be used as explanatory factors (party list, party identification, vote, socio-demographics, media exposure, political attitudes), the research teams in both countries agreed to include a specific battery of questions concerning the “Economic crisis and its alternatives” both in the CCS study and in the voters studies. This comparable battery of questions put almost in identical wording in both studies to party candidates and voters allows us to study not only how both citizens and the political elites evaluate the bailout Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), austerity policies and their social and political effects, but also to explore the congruence of political elites vis-à-vis their constituents, and thus to examine the quality of political representation during the financial and economic crisis.

More specifically, both the candidates and the voters in the two countries have been asked to express their opinion both for a list of statements regarding the economic crisis and the bailouts agreements^{vi}. The question of the accountability was explored by distinguishing between a “national” sphere/arena, one “European” (including the participation of the countries in the Eurozone) and the one of the global bank system^{vii}.

In methodological terms, to compare evaluations of the Troika agreements and of their social and political effects, as well as blame attribution, both across countries and across levels we will use percentage differences. Within each country, to test for differences between the political parties (both at the candidates’ and the voters’ levels) we use appropriate statistical tests and correlation/association measures.

Greek and Portuguese Elites’ and Voters’ Attitudes towards the Troika Agreements

In terms of the evaluation of the Troika agreements, we compare the answers to three statements about the bailouts and debt renegotiation included in the Greek and Portuguese surveys. These are: “the Portuguese or Greek Negotiators were wrong to accept the bailout from the Troika Agreement”, “the Portuguese or Greek Negotiators should have been able to get much better terms on the loan from Troika” and “we should force the creditors of the debt of countries to absorb at least a portion of that debt”. In Table 1.1 we compare Greek and Portuguese citizens’ answers to those positions. In Table 1.2 we compare Greek and Portuguese prospective MPs’ answers to the same items. Finally, in Tables 1.3 (Portugal) and 1.4 (Greece), we analyze the levels of congruence between elites and voters about the evaluations of the Troika agreements and the issue of debt renegotiation.

Table 1.1 around here

Table 1.2 around here

Table 1.3 around here

Table 1.4 around here

Concerning Greek and Portuguese citizens’ evaluations of the Troika agreements and debt renegotiation (Table 1.1), some remarks are due. First, when asked if the «Portuguese or Greek Negotiators were wrong to accept the bailout from the Troika Agreement», we can see that, overall, a majority of Greek citizens have a negative evaluation of the agreement (68.3% agree with the sentence), but only a minority of Portuguese citizens do it (43.4%). This seems to partially contradict the first hypothesis of our study for Portugal, and partially confirm it for Greece. However, we should bear in mind that, with this question we are not asking an evaluation of the austerity packages but if it was right or wrong to sign the bailouts in both countries. Moreover, we should bear in

mind that more recent surveys (fielded in May 2013) showed that even in Portugal an overwhelming majority (more than eighty percent) is now in favour either of breaking out the agreement (41%) or of pursuing a renegotiation of it (41.5%).^{viii} In any case, this data reveal that Greek citizens are much more critical of the bailout than the Portuguese (confirming H2). Moreover, dispersion of attitudes and a polarization concerning the bailout is also much stronger in Greece than in Portugal (confirming H3): the difference between the higher value (82.8% and 53.8%, respectively) and the minimum value (46.4% and 32%, respectively) at the party level is greater in Greece than in Portugal. The fourth hypothesis of our study is confirmed for Portugal but not for Greece. Namely, in Portugal the radical left sympathizers are against the bailout, while the center-left and center-right sympathizers are not. In Greece we find a majority of critics of the Troika agreement both among the radical left (82.8%) and among the center-right (ND: 64.9%) sympathizers. The high percentage of disagreement among the Greek centre-right voters could be explained by the fact that ND has been very critical to the first MoU signed by PASOK and its leader Samaras had continuously expressed the opinion in favour of a renegotiation of the bailout agreement. Thus, the Troika bloc seems to be much more divided in Greece than in Portugal.

Concerning the second question («The Portuguese or Greek Negotiators should have been able to get much better terms on the loan from Troika»), there are overwhelming citizen majorities in favour of better conditions in both countries and in all parties, thus confirming H1, even if the numbers in Greece are a bit higher than in Portugal (confirming H2) (see Table 1.1). Variations across parties, in any country, are rather small (not clearly confirming H4), even if dispersion is higher in Greece than in Portugal (confirming H3).

Finally, concerning debt renegotiation («We should force the creditors of the debt of countries to absorb at least a portion of that debt») at the citizens' level the results are

paradoxical and contradict some of our hypotheses (Table 1.1). First, although overall there is a majority of citizens in favour of debt renegotiation in Portugal (68%) the same cannot be said about Greece (48.4). Second, in Greece only the radical left is in favour, but in Portugal all party groups are in favour (although more on the left than on the right). Thus, this data confirms H1 for Portugal but not for Greece, and it does not confirm H2. This paradox can be due to the fact that debt restructuring already took place in Greece, but not in Portugal.

Moving to the results at the elite level (candidates), concerning the first question, the Greek candidates remain much more critical of the bailout (60.4%) than the Portuguese (44.4%), thus confirming H2 (Table 1.2). For the second question (“better conditions for the loan”), there is overwhelming criticism vis-à-vis the bailout in both Greece, 86%, and Portugal, 71.4%, and our predictions concerning H2 are again confirmed. For the third question, the same paradoxical situation we found for the citizens is found for the candidates: Portuguese prospective MPs are much more in favour of debt renegotiation (50.8%) than Greece (26.9%), and explanation for this deviation vis-à-vis H2 is perhaps the same as for the citizens, thus the fact that a debt restructuring took place in Greece. However, the most interesting thing is perhaps that, at the elite level, there is huge partisan dealignment in Greece but the contrary happens in Portugal. For all the three questions, but especially for questions one and two, criticism vis-à-vis the status quo comes mainly for the radical left and non-mainstream parties in Portugal (confirming H4 and H6.1). In Greece, however, criticism comes mainly from radical left and extreme right (as predicted by H4 and H6.2) but also from the center-right ND (not confirming H4 and H6.2). As mentioned above, an important factor for this deviation is the criticism of ND towards the first MoU. Thus, the «Troika parties» (i.e., the parties that signed the bailout or are enforcing it) are much more divided among themselves in Greece than in Portugal.

Concerning the levels of congruence between voters and candidates in terms of the evaluation of the bailouts (first three questions) two fundamental remarks are due. First, concerning the Portuguese case (Table 1.3) we can see that the center-right is more congruent with their voters in only one case (first question), not confirming H5.1, but not in the other two questions, confirming H5.1. I.e., the left (radical and center-left) is usually more in tune with a mainly critical citizenry (visa-à-vis the bailout) than the center-right. Second, in Greece there is no clear pattern for levels of congruence: among an overwhelmingly critical citizenry (except perhaps for debt renegotiation), incongruence comes mainly from the extremes (first question), from the right (second question) or from the left (third question). Partisan dealignment vis-à-vis the bailout agreements, with the center-right mainstream party (ND) both in government, enforcing the second MoU, and criticizing the bailout agreements is perhaps a major factor to explain those paradoxical and not expected results.

Greek and Portuguese Elites' and Voters' Attitudes about whom to blame about economic recession

On the whole, candidates and voters in both countries assign the greatest responsibility for the economic crisis to the government and bankers. Fewer responsibilities are assigned to the European Union. The statement "we are all to blame" is also supported by fewer respondents. However, we can highlight differences between the two countries, between voters and candidates and between groups of political parties.

Table 2.1 around here

The majority of the Greek and Portuguese voters assign responsibility for the fact that the economy has been in recession to their national government, confirming the first hypothesis of our study.

Observing more carefully the figures displayed in Table 2.1 we notice a significant difference for the center-left voters (most of them are PASOK voters): There are more people in this group that agree the statement “We are all to blame for the economic problems in Greece as we all got too greedy, and were living above our possibilities” (76.3%) than people who blame the Government (72.9%). This finding is in agreement with H4 – and the discussion before i.e. “citizens who identify with a party which called for IMF intervention, feel partially responsible and thus rationalize this choice”. Another important finding is that extreme right voters in Greece give to the bankers the first place on this “blame” ranking, since bankers' responsibilities are slightly above (80.2%) the responsibilities of the government (79.1%).

The differences between party groups are smaller in Portugal than in Greece. For instance if we calculate the difference between the maximum and the minimum percentage in Portugal and in Greece for each of the four statements about the responsibility for the economic recession, the results are the following: 1st statement (government responsibility): 15.5%(Portugal) and 18% (Greece); 2nd statement (EU responsibility): 12.6% (Portugal) 20.2% (Greece); 3rd statement (bankers): 20.8% (Portugal) and 26.4 (Greece) and 4th statement: 23.7% (Portugal) and 33.6% (Greece). Therefore, the third hypothesis (lower dispersion among the Portuguese compared to the Greeks) is confirmed from the voters side.

Table 2.2 around here

Comparing the attitudes of the Greek and Portuguese candidates as far as it concerns the issue of the responsibility (Table 2.2), the results reveal some interesting patterns. The third hypothesis of our study is verified for the last three of the four

statements: For the first statement (government responsibilities) we observe larger range (max-min) of values in Portugal (41.4%) than in Greece (31.9%). This is mainly a result of a tendency of the center left Portuguese candidates to defend the government and they appear with the smallest percent (53.8%) to blame the government. The difference between Portugal and Greece is negative for the first and the fourth statement and positive for the second and the third statement. This means that Portuguese candidates tend to assign fewer responsibilities to the government and the public and more responsibilities to the EU and the bankers than their Greek counterparts.

Table 2.3 around here

Table 2.4 around here

From Table 2.3 we should point out the large differences between Portuguese voters and candidates regarding the responsibilities of the European Union for the poor economic conditions. For all parties the level of incongruence is more than 20%. Therefore, it seems that voters of all Portuguese parties are more pro-European compared to their candidates by more than 20%. Juxtaposing this finding with the relevant results for the Greek case (Table 2.4), for the right wing groups we observe a positive difference (8.6%), for center left a small negative difference (-11.7%) and only the radical left and extreme right groups have negative differences of more than 20%.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have tried to investigate the attitudes of the Greek and Portuguese political elites, as well as their constituents towards various dimensions of the financial and economic crisis, namely the Troika agreements, the austerity policies and their social and political consequences. A central question of our study was whether we can identify points of convergence between the political elites and the voters and if there are different levels of congruence (or lack of it) between voters and their representatives both across the two countries of our study and across parties within each country.

Overall, the findings appear to indicate that the so-called Troika bloc seems to be much more a salient divide in Greece than in Portugal both from the demand and the supply side of the electoral competition perspective. In Portugal criticism comes mainly from the radical left and non-mainstream parties, while in Greece, it is also expressed from the centre-right bloc (except of the radical left and extreme right blocs). Taking into account the results from the elite surveys, we might conclude that the bailout agreement exhibits a cross-cutting pattern mainly in the Greek candidates compared to the Portuguese.

The results indicate some differences in public opinion towards the bailouts in the two countries. The Greeks are more against the bailout agreement, while the Portuguese data reveal trends towards more moderate positions. Another noteworthy difference is the fact that while in Portugal there is a clear division among the radical left sympathizers who are against the bailout and the center-left and center-right sympathizers who are not, in Greece negative views of the bailout deals crosscut all parties. Voters both from the radical left, the extreme right, but also the center-right are against the bailout, confirming the general disagreement.

From the results on the question about the responsibility of the economic recession, we can figure out that the voters in both countries assign the greatest blame to their national governments. The banking system is in the second position, while the EU is in the third position in this ranking. The Portuguese and Greek voters that perceive that the EU is economically responsible are mainly those who voted radical left parties in both countries in 2011 and 2012 and the socialists in Portugal. Therefore, we might conclude that the issue of the accountability for the harsh economic situation in both countries is more attributed to the national sphere than the European one. Analyzing the same question from the perspective of the political elites of the two countries we can figure out an interesting differentiation: the Portuguese candidates tend to assign fewer

responsibilities to the government and more responsibilities to the EU and the bankers than their Greek counterparts.

Comparing the levels of congruence between voters and candidates in terms of the evaluation of the bailouts some contradictory results came out. Overall, in Portugal we can identify higher levels of congruence compared to Greece.

However, this is the first attempt to study the positions of both voters and political elites three years after the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in the countries of the European periphery. Further research is needed in order to establish that the observed dissimilarities between the two cases hold as the crisis continues to unfold or whether these dissimilarities are the outcome of more short-term contextual and contingent factors.

Table 1.1 – Evaluation of the Bailout agreements signed by the Portuguese & Greek governments with the *Troika* (IMF, EC and ECB) & Debt renegotiation (column percentages) – among Portuguese and Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters: V)

Independent variable: Party Identification						
	Radical left sympathizers	Centre-left sympathizers	Right-wing sympathizers	Extreme-right Sympathizer	Non-partisan respondents	All respondents
The Portuguese or Greek Negotiators were wrong to accept the bailout from the Troika Agreement. (only the two last categories are shown)						
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	53.8	43.5	32	-	42.8	43.4
Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	82.8	46.4	64.9	75.0	70.3	68.3
Diff. PT – GR	-29	-2.9	-32.9		-27.5	-24.9
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters): Pearson's Chi-Square:56.694, Df=12, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.140						
Greek Sympathizers (Voters) Pearson's Chi-Square:118.801; Df=16; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.295						
The Portuguese or Greek Negotiators should have been able to get much better terms on the loan from Troika. (only the two last categories are shown)						
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	79.1	74.7	77.8	-	80.4	78.6
Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	83.0	87.6	81.1	75.8	81.7	82.3
Diff. PT – GR	-3.9	-12.9	-3.3		-1.3	-3.7
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters): Pearson's Chi-Square: 34.847, Df=12, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.109						
Greek Sympathizers (Voters) Pearson's Chi-Square:51.359; Df=16; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.030						
We should force the creditors of the debt of countries to absorb at least a portion of that debt. (only the two last categories are shown)						
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	79	64.1	60	-	67.9	68
Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	61.7	33.8	41.4	55.1	50.6	48.4
Diff. PT – GR	17.3	30.3	18.6		17.3	19.6
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters): Pearson's Chi-Square:35.117, Df=12, P=0.007; Eta Correlation =0.111						
Greek Sympathizers (Voters) Pearson's Chi-Square:67.955; Df=16; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.207						

Source: 2012 Mass Survey (taking into account the 2011 Census Data – INE 2011 – the sample was weighted by region, sex, gender and education), N = 1209; 2012 Greek Voters Survey – 2012 Elections; N = 1026.

Notes:

- 1) Portugal: Radical Left: *Bloco de Esquerda* (BE) and *Partido Comunista Português* (PCP)/ *Partido Ecologista "Os Verdes"* (PEV); Centre-left: *Partido Socialista* (PS); Rightwing: *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD) & *Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular* (CDS-PP); Extreme-right: no Cases.
- 2) Greece: Radical Left: *Coalition of Radical Left* (SYRIZA), *Communist Party of Greece* (KKE), *Anticapitalist Left Cooperation for the Overthrow* (ANTARSYA); Centre-left: *Panbellenic Socialist Movement*

(PASOK), *Democratic Left* (DIMAR), *Ecologist-Greens* (OP); Rightwing: *New Democracy* (ND), *Action* (DRASI), *Recreate Greece* (DX); Extreme-right: *Independent Greeks* (ANEL), *Popular Orthodox Rally* (LAOS), *Golden Dawn* (XA) (5 Pirate party voters were excluded)

Table 1.2 – Evaluation of the Bailout agreements signed by the Portuguese & Greek governments with the *Troika* (IMF, EC and ECB) & Debt renegotiation (column percentages) – among Portuguese and Greek Prospective MPs (Candidates in Legislative Elections, 2011 and 2012)

Independent variable: Party List						
	Radical left sympathizers	Centre-left sympathizers	Right-wing sympathizers	Extreme-right Sympathizer	Non-partisan respondents	All respondents
The Portuguese or Greek Negotiators were wrong to accept the bailout from the Troika Agreement. (only the two last categories are shown)						
Portuguese Candidates in 2011 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	97	7.8	9.7	-	-	44.4
Greek Candidates in 2012 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	96.1	44.5	77.0	100.0		60.4
Diff. PT – GR	0.9	-36.7	-67.3			-16
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Candidates): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:226.636, Df=8, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.857</i>						
Greek Sympathizers (Candidates) <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:110.978; Df=12; P<0.001; Eta Correlation =0.495</i>						
The Portuguese or Greek Negotiators should have been able to get much better terms on the loan from Troika. (only the two last categories are shown)						
Portuguese Candidates in 2011 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	81.9	67.3	63.4	-	-	71.4
Greek Candidates in 2012 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	72.5	85.9	96.7	100.0		86.0
Diff. PT – GR	9.4	-18.6	-33.3			-14.6
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Candidates): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:70.168, Df=8, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.392</i>						
Greek Sympathizers (Candidates) <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:36.695; Df=12; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.253</i>						
We should force the creditors of the debt of countries to absorb at least a portion of that debt. (only the two last categories are shown)						
Portuguese Candidates in 2011 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	82.6	48	21.5	-	-	50.8
Greek Candidates in 2012 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	84.3	12.6	23.0	40.0		26.9
Diff. PT – GR	-1.7	35.4	-1.5			23.9
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Candidates): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:112.356, Df=8, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.634</i>						
Greek Sympathizers (Candidates) <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:120.639; Df=12; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.568</i>						

Source: 2011 Portuguese Candidate Survey: N = 257 (taking into account the 2011 Census Data – INE 2011 – the sample was weighted by party list and gender); 2012 Greek Candidate Survey – 2012 Elections: N = 308 (there are only 5 extreme right).

Notes:

- Portugal: Radical Left: *Bloco de Esquerda* (BE) and *Partido Comunista Português* (PCP)/ *Partido Ecologista "Os Verdes"* (PEV); Centre-left: *Partido Socialista* (PS); Rightwing: *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD) & *Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular* (CDS-PP); Extreme-right: no Cases.

- 4) Greece: Radical Left: *Coalition of Radical Left* (SYRIZA); Centre-left: *Panhellenic Socialist Movement* (PASOK), *Democratic Left* (DIMAR), *Ecologist-Greens* (OP); Rightwing: *New Democracy* (ND); Extreme-right: *Independent Greeks* (ANEL), *Golden Dawn* (XA) (there are only 5 responses in this category)

Table 1.3 – Evaluation of the Bailout agreement signed by the Portuguese socialist government (and rightwing parties) with the *Troika* (IMF, EC and ECB) & Debt renegotiation (column percentages) – for Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters: V) & Portuguese Legislative Candidates, 2011, by party list

Independent variables: Party Identification & Party List						
	Radical left sympathizers	Centre-left sympathizers	Right-wing sympathizers	Extreme-right Sympathizer	Non-partisan respondents	All respondents
The PS government and the rightwing parties (PSD and CDS-PP) were wrong to accept the bailout from the Troika Agreement. (only the two last categories are shown)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	53.8	43.5	32	-	42.8	43.4
Legislative Candidates 2011						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	97	7.8	9.7	-	-	44.4
Diff. V – C	-43.2	35.7	22.3	-	-	-1
Party Sympathizers (Voters): Pearson's Chi-Square:56.694, Df=12, P =0.000; Eta Correlation = 0.140						
Candidates: Pearson's Chi-Square:226.636; Df=8; P =0.000; Eta Correlation = 0.857						
The PS government and the rightwing parties (PSD and CDS-PP) should have been able to get much better terms on the loan from Troika. (only the two last categories are shown)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	79.1	74.7	77.8	-	80.4	78.6
Legislative Candidates 2011						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	81.9	67.3	63.4	-	-	71.4
Diff. V – C	-2.8	7.4	14.4	-	-	7.2
Party Sympathizers (Voters): Pearson's Chi-Square:34.847, Df=12, P =0.000; Eta Correlation = 0.109						
Candidates: Pearson's Chi-Square:70.168; Df=8; P =0.000; Eta Correlation =0.392						
We should force the creditors of the debt of countries to absorb at least a portion of that debt. (only the two last categories are shown)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	79	64.1	60	-	67.9	68
Legislative Candidates 2011						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	82.6	48	21.5	-	-	50.8
Diff. V – C	-3.6	16.1	38.5	-	-	17.2
Party Sympathizers (Voters): Pearson's Chi-Square:35.117, Df=12, P =0.000; Eta Correlation =0.111						
Candidates: Pearson's Chi-Square:112.356; Df=8; P =0.000; Eta Correlation =0.634						

Source: 2012 Mass Survey (taking into account the 2011 Census Data – INE 2011 – the sample was weighted by region, sex, gender and education) – N = 1209; 2012-13 Candidate Survey (the sample was weighted by party list and gender) – 2011 Elections; N = 257.

Table 1.4 – Evaluation of the Bailout agreement signed by the Greek government (PASOK) with the *Troika* (IMF, EC and ECB) & Debt renegotiation (column percentages) – for Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters: V) & Greek Legislative Candidates, 2011, by party list

Independent variables: Party Identification & Party List						
	Radical left sympathizers	Centre-left sympathizers	Right-wing sympathizers	Extreme-right Sympathizer	Non-partisan respondents	All respondents
The Greek government (PASOK) was wrong to accept the bailout from the Troika Agreement. (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	82.8	46.4	64.9	75.0	70.3	68.3
Legislative Candidates 2012						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	96.1	44.5	77.0	100.0		60.4
Diff. V – C	-13.3	1.9	-12.1	-25		7.9
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:118.801; Df=16; P <0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.295</i>						
Candidates: <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:110.978; Df=12; P <0.001; Eta Correlation =0.495</i>						
The Greek government (PASOK) should have been able to get much better terms on the loan from Troika. (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	83.0	87.6	81.1	75.8	81.7	82.3
Legislative Candidates 2012						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	72.5	85.9	96.7	100.0		86.0
Diff. V – C	10.5	1.7	-15.6	-24.2		-3.7
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:51.359; Df=16; P <0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.030</i>						
Candidates: <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:36.695; Df=12; P <0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.253</i>						
We should force the creditors of the debt of countries to absorb at least a portion of that debt. (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	61.7	33.8	41.4	55.1	50.6	48.4
Legislative Candidates 2012						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	84.3	12.6	23.0	40.0		26.9
Diff. V – C	-22.6	21.2	18.4	15.1		21.5
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:67.955; Df=16; P <0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.207</i>						
Candidates: <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:120.639; Df=12; P <0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.568</i>						

Source: 2012 Mass Survey– N = 1026; 2012-13 Candidate Survey – 2012 Elections; N = 308.

Table 2.1 – Who should be blamed for the economic recession in the past two years? (column percentages) – among Portuguese and Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters: V)

Independent variable: Party Identification						
	Radical left sympathizers	Centre-left sympathizers	Right-wing sympathizers	Extreme-right Sympathizer	Non-partisan respondents	All respondents
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The Government (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	89.6	84.8	74.1	-	85.3	84.5
Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	90.9	72.9	77.6	79.1	77.2	79.7
Diff. PT – GR	-1.3	11.9	-3.5		8.1	4.8
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters): Pearson's Chi-Square:49.019, Df=12, P =0.000; Eta Correlation =0.156						
Greek Sympathizers (Voters) Pearson's Chi-Square:69.393; Df =16; P <0.001; Eta Correlation =0.177						
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The European Union (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	52.9	55.1	42.5	-	50.9	51.2
Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	58.2	38.0	46.3	47.8	52.5	49.5
Diff. PT – GR	-5.3	17.1	-3.8		-1.6	1.7
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters): Pearson's Chi-Square:39.835, Df=12, P =0.000; Eta Correlation =0.105						
Greek Sympathizers (Voters) Pearson's Chi-Square:62.931; Df =16; P <0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.157						
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The Bankers (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	79.8	69.5	59	-	63.7	66.9
Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	84.9	64.8	58.5	80.2	68.4	70.3
Diff. PT – GR	-5.1	4.7	0.5		-4.7	-3.4
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters): Pearson's Chi-Square:50.138, Df=12, P =0.000; Eta Correlation =0.158						
Greek Sympathizers (Voters) Pearson's Chi-Square:66.631; Df =16; P <0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.239						
We are all to blame for the economic problems in Portugal OR Greece as we all got too greedy, and were living above our possibilities. (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	37.6	46.6	56.4	-	32.7	39.1
Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	42.7	76.3	62.8	48.4	56.6	57.5
Diff. PT – GR	-5.1	-29.7	-6.4		-23.9	-18.4
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters): Pearson's Chi-Square:68.639, Df=12, P =0.000; Eta Correlation =0.194						
Greek Sympathizers (Voters) Pearson's Chi-Square:66.092, Df =16, P <0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.213						

Source: 2012 Mass Survey (taking into account the 2011 Census Data – INE 2011 – the sample was weighted by region, sex, gender and education), N = 1209; 2012 Greek National Election Study (ELNES); N = 1026.
Notes: see as Table 1.1

Table 2.2 – Evaluation of the Bailout agreements signed by the Portuguese & Greek governments with the *Troika* (IMF, EC and ECB) & Debt renegotiation (column percentages) – among Portuguese and Greek Prospective MPs, 2011 and 2012)

Independent variable: Party List						
	Radical left sympathizers	Centre-left sympathizers	Right-wing sympathizers	Extreme-right Sympathizer	Non-partisan respondents	All respondents
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The Government (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Portuguese Candidates in 2011 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	95.2	53.8	86.5	-	-	86.3
Greek Candidates in 2012 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	98.0	68.1	90.2	100.0		77.9
Diff. PT – GR	-2.8	-14.3	-3.7			8.4
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Candidates): Pearson's Chi-Square:103.744, Df=8, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.493						
Greek Sympathizers (Candidates) Pearson's Chi-Square:46.115; Df=12; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.345						
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The European Union (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Portuguese Candidates in 2011 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	91.2	88.4	64.4	-	-	79.9
Greek Candidates in 2012 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	80.4	49.7	37.7	80.0		52.9
Diff. PT – GR	10.8	38.7	26.7			27
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Candidates): Pearson's Chi-Square:50.658, Df=8, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.349						
Greek Sympathizers (Candidates) Pearson's Chi-Square: 46.191; Df=12; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.309						
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The Bankers (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Portuguese Candidates in 2011 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	97	88.4	70.5	-	-	84.7
Greek Candidates in 2012 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	92.2	70.2	54.1	100.0		71.1
Diff. PT – GR	4.8	18.2	16.4			13.6
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Candidates): Pearson's Chi-Square:68.145, Df=8, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.450						
Greek Sympathizers (Candidates) Pearson's Chi-Square: 41.996; Df=12; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.309						
We are all to blame for the economic problems in Portugal OR Greece as we all got too greedy, and were living above our possibilities. (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Portuguese Candidates in 2011 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	1	15.4	69.3	-	-	31.5
Greek Candidates in 2012 Legislative Elections						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	3.9	74.3	73.8	20.0		61.7
Diff. PT – GR	-2.9	-58.9	-4.5			-30.2
Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Candidates): Pearson's Chi-Square:171.891, Df=8, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.735						
Greek Sympathizers (Candidates) Pearson's Chi-Square: 145.772; Df=12; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.631						

Source: 2011 Portuguese Candidate Survey: N = 257 (taking into account the 2011 Census Data – INE 2011 – the sample was weighted by party list and gender); 2012 Greek Candidate Survey – 2012 Elections: N = 308.

Notes: see as Table 1.2

Table 2.3 – Evaluation of the Bailout agreement signed by the Portuguese socialist government (and rightwing parties) with the *Troika* (IMF, EC and ECB) & Debt renegotiation (column percentages) – for Portuguese Party Sympathizers (Voters: V) & Portuguese Legislative Candidates, 2011, by party list

Independent variables: Party Identification & Party List						
	Radical left sympathizers	Centre-left sympathizers	Right-wing sympathizers	Extreme-right Sympathizer	Non-partisan respondents	All respondents
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The Government (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	89.6	84.8	74.1	-	85.3	84.5
Legislative Candidates 2011						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	95.2	53.8	86.5	-	-	86.3
Diff. V – C	-5.6	31	-12.4	-	-	-1.8
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:49.019, Df=12, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.156</i>						
Candidates: <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:103.744; Df=8; P=0.000; Eta Correlation = 0.493</i>						
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The European Union (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	52.9	55.1	42.5	-	50.9	51.2
Legislative Candidates 2011						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	91.2	88.4	64.4	-	-	79.9
Diff. V – C	-38.3	-33.3	-21.9	-	-	-28.7
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:39.835, Df=12, P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.105</i>						
Candidates: <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:50.658; Df=8; P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.349</i>						
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The Bankers (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	79.8	69.5	59	-	63.7	66.9
Legislative Candidates 2011						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	97	88.4	70.5	-	-	84.7
Diff. V – C	-17.2	-18.9	-11.5	-	-	-17.8
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:50.138, Df=12, P=0.000; Eta Correlation = 0.158</i>						
Candidates: <i>Pearson's Chi-Square: 68.145; Df=8; P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.450</i>						
We are all to blame for the economic problems in Portugal OR Greece as we all got too greedy, and were living above our possibilities. (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	37.6	46.6	56.4	-	32.7	39.1
Legislative Candidates 2011						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	1	15.4	69.3	-	-	31.5
Diff. V – C	36.6	31.2	-12.9	-	-	7.6
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:68.639, Df=12, P=0.000; Eta Correlation = 0.194</i>						

Candidates: *Pearson's Chi-Square:171.891; Df=8; P=0.000; Eta Correlation =0.735*

Source: 2012 Mass Survey (taking into account the 2011 Census Data – INE 2011 – the sample was weighted by region, sex, gender and education) – N = 1209; 2012-13 Candidate Survey (the sample was weighted by party list and gender) – 2011 Elections; N = 257.

Table 2.4 – Evaluation of the Bailout agreement signed by the Greek government (PASOK) with the *Troika* (IMF, EC and ECB) & Debt renegotiation (column percentages) – for Greek Party Sympathizers (Voters: V) & Greek Legislative Candidates, 2012, by party list

Independent variables: Party Identification & Party List						
	Radical left sympathizers	Centre-left sympathizers	Right-wing sympathizers	Extreme-right Sympathizer	Non-partisan respondents	All respondents
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The Government (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	90.9	72.9	77.6	79.1	77.2	79.7
Legislative Candidates 2012						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	98.0	68.1	90.2	100.0		77.9
Diff. V – C	-7.1	4.8	-12.6	-20.9		1.8
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:69.393; Df=16; P<0.001; Eta Correlation =0.177</i>						
Candidates: <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:46.115; Df=12; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.345</i>						
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The European Union (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	58.2	38.0	46.3	47.8	52.5	49.5
Legislative Candidates 2012						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	80.4	49.7	37.7	80.0		52.9
Diff. V – C	-22.2	-11.7	8.6	-32.2		-3.4
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:62.931; Df=16; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.157</i>						
Candidates: <i>Pearson's Chi-Square: 46.191; Df=12; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.309</i>						
How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? The Bankers (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	84.9	64.8	58.5	80.2	68.4	70.3
Legislative Candidates 2012						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	92.2	70.2	54.1	100.0		71.1
Diff. V – C	-7.3	-5.4	4.4	-19.8		-0.8
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:66.631; Df=16; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.239</i>						
Candidates: <i>Pearson's Chi-Square: 41.996; Df=12; P<0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.309</i>						
We are all to blame for the economic problems in Portugal OR Greece as we all got too greedy, and were living above our possibilities. (<i>only the two last categories are shown</i>)						
Party Sympathizers (Voters)						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	42.7	76.3	62.8	48.4	56.6	57.5
Legislative Candidates 2012						
Agree (slightly & strongly)	3.9	74.3	73.8	20.0		61.7

& strongly)						
Diff. V – C	38.8	2	-11	28.4		-4.2
Party Sympathizers (Voters): <i>Pearson's Chi-Square:66.092, Df =16, P <0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.213</i>						
Candidates: <i>Pearson's Chi-Square: 145.772; Df =12; P <0.001; Eta Correlation = 0.631</i>						

Source: 2012 ELNES– N = 1026; 2012-13 Candidate Survey – 2012 Elections; N = 308.

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ⁱ Boin et al’s definition, which we will be following in the present paper, underlines the constructed nature of the crisis: “when policy makers experience a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitate making vital decisions” (Boin et al., 2005: 2).

ⁱⁱ See for a comparison Laven, Zachary and Santi, Federico “EU austerity and reform: a country by country table”. Available at :<http://www.europeaninstitute.org/April-2012/eu-austerity-and-reform-a-country-by-country-table-updated-may-3.html>

ⁱⁱⁱ The small left-wing party of the Democratic Left (DIMAR) is included in the parties in favour of the bailout agreement because it was one of the partners of the coalition government formed in the aftermath of the national elections of June 2012, even though it joined the government under the preelectoral promise of helping to gradually detaching Greece from the bailout deal.

^{iv} See <http://www.cies.iscte.pt/en/projectos/ficha.jsp?pkid=502&a=1367577466747>

^v The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) has never agreed to participate in the Greek Candidate Study. Independent Greeks (ANEL) have not responded to requests to provide the Greek CCS team the email addresses of their candidates. Golden Dawn (XA) has replied that all candidates share the same opinion and they have agreed to answer one questionnaire centrally. The Greek CCS team was able to send invitations only to elected MPs of KKE, ANEL, and XA (their email addresses are available on the website of the Greek Parliament). This effort has resulted to the following responses: KKE: 0, ANEL: 3, XA: 1.

^{vi} The question was: Now I am going to read out some more statements that other people have made about the economy. Considering each one, can you please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each (from strongly agree to strongly disagree: a) The PS government and the rightwing parties (PSD and CDS-PP) –for Portugal /the PASOK government-for Greece were wrong to accept the bailout from the Troika Agreement; b) The PS government and the rightwing parties (PSD and CDS-PP)/ the PASOK government should have been able to get much better terms on the loan from Troika; c) We should “burn the bondholders”: that is, we should default on debt in the banks rather than take on more debt for the country; d) We are all to blame for the economic problems in Portugal/ Greece as we all got too greedy, and were living above our

possibilities; e) Those having difficulty in keeping up with their mortgage repayments should be assisted by financial support from the government.

^{vii} In order to further explore the question of the accountability, another set of questions was asked. For the Greek and Portuguese candidates and voters was: In the past few years the economy has been in recession. How responsible, if at all, are each of the following for the poor economic conditions of the past two years? Extremely responsible, Very responsible, moderately responsible, A little responsible, Not at all responsible: a) The Government; b) The European Union; c) Bankers; d) Membership in the Eurozone. In the Greek Voter study some other forces and actors have been included (except of the four aforementioned) . These are: the opposition parties, the "rating agencies", the German government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

^{viii} «Sondagem mostra vontade de renegociar ou denunciar acordo com a *troika*»,

<http://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/sondagem-mostra-vontade-de-renegociar-ou-denunciar-acordo-com-a-troika-1594818>